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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF AID ON INFLATION: 
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Dönmez, Ayça 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Selin Sayek Böke 
Co-supervisor: Asst. Prof. Bilin Neyaptı 
 
September 2005 
 
This thesis investigates the relationship between foreign aid and inflation 
considering the effect of financial market development (FMD) on this 
relationship. The main hypothesis is that aid has a significant positive impact on 
inflation. When the financial markets are developed enough, the upward effect of 
aid on inflation is expected to be diminished. The dynamic relationship is 
analyzed utilizing generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation which 
accommodates the use of an unbalanced panel data set, covering 60 countries in 
the period 1975-2004, where available. The results of the empirical analysis 
support the hypothesis. Furthermore, the results are robust to several control 
variables, and alternative measures of financial market development. 
 
Keywords: Aid, Inflation, Financial Market Development (FMD) 
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ÖZET 
 
İKTİSADİ YARDIMIN ENFLASYON ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİLERİ: 
MALİ PİYASADAKİ GELİŞMENİN ROLÜ 
Dönmez, Ayça 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Selin Sayek Böke 
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Bilin Neyaptı  
 
Eylül 2005 
 
Bu tez uluslararası iktisadi yardım ile enflasyon arasındaki ilişkiyi mali 
piyasalardaki gelişmenin bu ilişki üzerindeki etkisini de dikkate alarak 
araştırmaktadır. Ana hipotez, iktisadi yardımın enflasyon üzerinde anlamlı pozitif 
bir etkiye sahip olduğudur. Mali piyasalar yeterince gelişmiş olduğunda iktisadi 
yardımın enflasyonu arttırıcı etkisinin azalması beklenmektedir. Dinamik ilişki, 60 
ülke için 1975-2004 döneminin mümkün noktalarını kapsayan dengesiz panel veri 
kullanımına imkan sağlayan genelleştirilmiş momentler metodu (GMM) 
yardımıyla incelenmektedir. Araştırma sonuçları hipotezi desteklemektedir. 
Ayrıca, sonuçlar birçok kontrol değişkeni ve farklı mali piyasalardaki gelişme 
ölçütleri karşısında tutarlıdır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İktisadi Yardım, Enflasyon, Mali Piyasalardaki Gelişme 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the early 19th century to date, the term “foreign aid” has been used in 
the literature to mean transfer of resources or income from a donor country or 
international agency to another country to achieve predetermined objectives. 
Although, at the beginning, aid was used to fund wars (Moger, 1999), now, it is 
used for more humanistic purposes like making poverty history, evident from the 
campaign announced during the recent G8 summit. Indeed, the G8 summit held in 
June 2005 ended with an agreement to boost aid for developing countries by $50 
billion (£28.8 billion), of which $25 billion would go to Africa over the next five 
years. Moreover, G8 members from the European Union (EU) committed to reach 
a collective foreign aid target of 0.56% of GDP by 2010, and 0.7% by 2015. The 
discussions addressing whether the decisions made by the G8 are enough to make 
poverty history or not have been going on. However, before dealing with these 
discussions, we believe that the effects of aid on the recipient economies need to 
be studied further so as to shed some light on the ambiguity in the aid literature. 
Our motivation for this study receives its strength from this point. We believe that 
upon clarifying the “good” and/or “bad” effects, as well as the conditions 
influencing the overall impact of foreign aid, it becomes possible to discuss 
 2 
thoroughly the decisions about the direction, timing, amount, usage, etc. of aid 
flows. 
The sizable literature on aid generally focuses on the causality from aid to 
domestic investment and growth. While Boone (1994 and 1996) says, aid has no 
effect on the recipient country’s growth and investment, Burnside and Dollar 
(1997 and 2000) state that aid is beneficial to real gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth if recipient government has good economic policies. The ambiguity of the 
effect of aid is also reflected in studies on the relation between aid and real 
exchange rate. For instance, while Younger (1992) and Vos (1998) find empirical 
evidence that aid inflows cause real exchange rate appreciation, Nyoni (1998) 
finds that aid inflows cause depreciation. Furthermore, Dijkstra and van Donge 
(2001) find no impact of aid on real exchange rate. 
Among the studies seeking to elucidate the impact of aid on fiscal, monetary 
and trade policies, our focus will mainly be on the nominal effects of aid. 
Although there are some studies commenting on inflationary or deflationary 
effects of aid (Roemer, 1989; Younger, 1992 and Buffie et al., 2004), to the best 
of our knowledge, existing empirical work has not explored the importance of aid 
in the dynamics of inflation. This paper attempts to fill the void in the literature by 
modeling inflation as being influenced by foreign aid. The importance of this 
study is improved by the consideration of the effect of financial market 
development (FMD) on this relation. The main hypothesis is that foreign aid has a 
significantly positive impact on inflation. If financial markets are well developed, 
however, the upward effect of aid on inflation is expected to be diminished since 
 3 
it is presumed that the recipient economy’s capacity to absorb or manage inflows 
of aid increases as financial sector develops. 
When foreign aid inflows to an economy, the net foreign assets of the central 
bank is expected to be increased, and this cause a rise in money supply. In 
addition, as government spending increases, as a result of increased income after 
aid inflow, the aggregate demand increases. This increase in aggregate demand 
gives rise to an increase in prices.  
In detail, when aid results in an increase in money supply, total demand for 
both tradable and nontradable goods and services1 increase as a result of the 
increase in welfare or income of the recipient country’s public after the inflow. If 
the foreign aid is spent only on imports2, it will have no direct impact on the 
money supply or aggregate demand in the economy because the balance of 
payment will show both a capital account and an offsetting current account deficit. 
Moreover, the increased demand for tradable can be satisfied directly by imports, 
without changing the structure of domestic production. However, the increased 
demand for nontradable pushes the prices of domestic goods and services upward 
unless there exists excess capacity of production3.  
When the central bank believes there is too much inflationary pressure in the 
economy, it interferes to reduce the level of aggregate demand. In other words, the 
                                                 
1
 Tradable goods and services include imports and domestically produced import substitutes, and 
their prices are determined in world markets. On the other hand, nontradable consist of 
domestically produced and consumed goods and services, and their price is determined by the 
changes in domestic supply and demand. 
2
 Note that, the recipient government is more likely to use some portion of incoming aid on 
nontradable, such as public service, than to use the entire aid on imports. 
3
 As a result, a shift in production from exportable to nontradable occurs and this leads a decrease 
in competitiveness in international market. This phenemona is called Dutch disease in literature 
and the volume of  the damage depends on the share of nontradable in the aggregate consumption.  
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central bank may choose to offset, or namely sterilize, the monetary expansion 
when the expansion results in fostering inflation. By selling foreign exchange, 
central bank may already decrease money supply but appreciates the exchange 
rate. By selling government bonds, i.e. domestic debt, to the private sector in 
exchange for domestic currency on the open market, central bank does bond 
sterilization but may cause the price of bond to fall. Since bond prices inversely 
related to interest rates, a fall in the price of bonds is followed by a rise in interest 
rates. Hence, if central bank tries to shrink money supply by selling bonds, it may 
drive up interest rates as well. 
Since the sterilization is processed through financial markets, such as the 
bond markets, the structure of financial markets plays a crucial role on the 
consequences of sterilization. Especially, the amount of the change following the 
sterilization depends on the structure of financial markets. As financial markets 
become more developed, the magnitude of the changes in the real exchange rate or 
in the domestic interest rate are diminished since central bank has more room to 
do sterilization with less cost then.  
During the modeling of inflation, as introduced in the traditional Phillips 
curve4, we primarily consider the persistence of inflation. A model dealing with 
the dynamic pattern of inflation is going to be used. This dynamic relationship is 
analyzed using an unbalanced panel data set, consisting of 60 countries over the 
1975 to 2004 period, where available. The study includes other controls, such as 
real GDP growth, growth of reserve money, and openness to trade. The estimation 
                                                 
4
 According to Gordon (1997), the Phillips curve explains inflation with the help of three basic 
factors: inertia, demand, and supply. 
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is based on the method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) that utilizes 
generalized method of moments (GMM) and the computer software packages 
Give Win 2.1 and Ox Version 3.10 are the tools of the model estimation. The 
results of the empirical analysis mainly provide robust evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis. It is observed that the effect of foreign aid on inflation is significantly 
positive and as financial markets develop, this upward pressure of aid on inflation 
lessens, indeed. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a 
review of literature on inflation determinants, capital flows and foreign aid. 
Chapter 3 describes the econometric methodology utilized during the analysis 
while laying down the theoretical background for the basic model, the hypothesis 
tested, the sources of data and the variables. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed 
model specification of inflation and reports the results of the regression analysis of 
these models. Chapter 5 makes concluding remarks, and provides a summary as 
well as a brief discussion on main findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews three branches of literature related to the subject of this 
study. The first part of the literature is about inflation, which defines inflation and 
identifies cross country determinants of inflation as well as the country specific 
determinants of inflation studied in the recent literature. In section 2.1.1, inflation 
is defined thoroughly, and measures of inflation are mentioned. Since the 
literature is too extensive to cover entirely, a brief summary of this literature is 
presented in section 2.1.2, where some traditional and recent theories on inflation 
are reviewed. Following this discussion, second part of the literature review is 
about capital flows. This part helps build a bridge between the capital flows and 
foreign aid literatures. In section 2.2, the reader can find the literature review of 
the effects of capital inflow on the economy, the actions taken to absorb large 
capital inflows and relation between foreign aid and capital inflows. Finally, the 
third part sheds some light on the foreign aid literature. This literature investigates 
the relationship among aid, growth, real exchange rate and the “Dutch Disease” 
phenomena. The sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 deal with the definition and the history 
of aid, respectively. While section 2.3.3 basically studies the aid and growth 
relation, section 2.3.4 includes studies on aid and “Dutch Disease” relation as well 
as aid’s impact on the real exchange rate. 
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2.1 Explaining Inflation 
Since the literature on the determinants of inflation is very extensive, we 
limit our review to a sample of cross-country studies and some country base 
studies. Before discussing the cross-country and country specific literature related 
to inflation in sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, respectively, the definition of inflation and 
its measures are provided in section 2.1.1. 
 
2.1.1 Definition of Inflation 
In economics, the inflation rate is the percentage rate of increase in the price 
index that measures the average price level. For our study, we use GDP deflator as 
the price index5. 
As stated by Dornbusch, et. al (1998), the calculation of real GDP gives us a 
useful measure of inflation known as the GDP deflator. The GDP deflator is the 
ratio of the total amount of money spent on GDP (nominal GDP) to the inflation-
corrected measure of GDP (constant-price or "real" GDP). In a more compact 
way, it is the average price of the flow of domestically produced goods and 
services (IMF, 1993). 
In IMF (1993), the GDP deflator is reported to be a more accurate measure 
of domestic demand and supply conditions since it is not directly affected by 
                                                 
5
 Note that there is no single true measure of inflation. However, because each measure is based on 
other measures and models of inflation, the probable bias either in measurement or in the model of 
inflation is considered by economists. In 1995, the Boskin Commission found the consumer price 
index produced by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics to be a biased 
measure, and stated that inflation was overstated by this measure. 
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changes in import prices. Since it is the broadest measure of the price level, that is, 
it is based on a calculation involving all the goods produced in the economy (not  
tied to a specific basket of consumer goods in a base year), we decided to use this 
price index as a measure of inflation6. 
 
2.1.2 Determinants of Inflation 
At the Wincott Memorial Lecture in London on September 16th, 1970, Nobel 
Prize Laureate economist Milton Friedman verbalized his famous lines: “Inflation 
is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Up till now, this epigram of 
Friedman has been repeated, studied, and approved many times by many of his 
colleagues and, as a result, inflation is accepted to be a monetary phenomenon in 
the theoretical literature. A recent study of IMF (2001), for instance, reported 
inflation to be the result of government financing its fiscal deficits through issuing 
money (which is called seigniorage) or the result of time inconsistent monetary 
policy. 
The voluminous literature on inflation determinants studies the impact of 
monetary policy, fiscal deficits, inflation inertia, and external shocks on inflation. 
Briefly, the results of the research about the triangle of fiscal deficits, seigniorage, 
and inflation change from one study to another as reported in IMF (2001). Besides 
these main inflationary factors, the role of the institutional structure, and trade 
related policies have also been studied. For instance, the empirical studies dealing 
with the relationship between central bank independence and inflation support 
                                                 
6
 The other examples of common measures of inflation used in literature are: the consumer price 
index, the producer price index, the cost of living index, the wholesale price index, the commodity 
price index, and the personal consumption expenditures price index. 
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negative significant relationship7. Besides, as summed up in IMF (2001), the 
results of the impact of openness to trade on inflation changes from sample to 
another, however greater openness to trade is mainly associated with lower 
inflation8. There are also studies dealing with inflationary effects of monetary 
expansion, price inertia, nominal exchange rate changes, and the world price of oil 
and other commodities. While, inflation inertia, changes in money growth or 
supply9, and nominal exchange rates’ changes are all found to be powerful in 
explaining inflation, changes in world price of oil and other commodities have 
been found to have less power in explaining inflation10. On the other hand, 
according to IMF (1996), output gap is not a powerful tool for explaining inflation 
in developing countries. 
While investigating the literature about inflation and money growth 
relation the quantity theory of money leads us to some related studies. The 
foundation of the quantity theory of money is introduced in David Hume’s essays 
of 1752, Of Money and Of Interest 11. There are two important statements of 
Hume shaping the quantity theory. According to the first statement of Hume, the 
changes in money have proportional effects on all prices expressed in terms of 
money. Secondly, these changes are assumed to have no real effect on how much 
people work, produce or consume.  
                                                 
7
 See Neyaptı(2003), for instance. 
8
 In IMF (2001), it is found that the effect of openness on inflation may, over the long term, occur 
largely through fiscal policy and financial developments that affect the size of inflation tax base. 
9
 In order to maintain the equilibrium point of supply and demand for money, monetary models 
support an increase in prices when the amount of money in the economy becomes greater than the 
amount of the public’s desire to hold. That is, an excess supply of money can be followed by an 
upward pressure on inflation like an excess demand for goods does. 
10
 See IMF (1996) and IMF (2001). 
11
 See Lucas (1996) for details and discussions. 
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Lucas (1996) develops Hume (1970)’s merely verbally introduced 
methods empirically. Lucas (1996) states: “This tension between two 
incompatible ideas -that changes in money are neutral units’ changes and that they 
induce movements in employment and production in the same direction- has been 
at the center of monetary theory at least since Hume wrote.” Furthermore, he 
adds: “Perhaps he (Hume) simply did not see that the irrelevance units’ changes 
from which he deduces the long-run neutrality of money has similar implications 
for the initial money changes as well.” A very close correlation between the rate 
of growth of monetary aggregates and inflation is strongly supported in Lucas 
(1996).  
McCandless and Weber (1995) find a 45-degree line fit for the graph of 
average annual inflation rates and average annual growth rates of M2 over the 
period of 1960-90 with 110 countries. They report the simple correlation between 
inflation and money growth as 0.95. The simple correlation becomes 0.96 when 
only OECD countries considered, while it is equal to 0.99 for 14 Latin American 
countries. McCandless and Weber (1995) do calculations using other monetary 
aggregates like M0 (high-powered money or the monetary base) and M1 for the 
whole sample and again find strong positive correlation (0.92 when M0 is used 
and 0.96 when M1 is used).  
James (1999) examines the forecasting performance of inflation with 
alternative indicators replacing unemployment in Phillips curve. Not supporting 
the previously mentioned studies on money growth and inflation, he found that the 
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models that use variables of money growth rates do not perform well12. On the 
contrary, Dwyer (2002) supports empirically that money growth is more useful for 
forecasting inflation in U.S. than other variables besides past inflation.  
The relationship between money growth and output growth shows ambiguity 
depending on the data set as stated by Lucas (1996). For instance, McCandless 
and Weber (1995) find a weak positive relation for OECD countries. When the 
whole sample of 110 countries is considered, however, there seems to be no 
relation. 
The increase in prices is linked to the choice of the policy response to 
stabilize the price level in Bahmani-Oskooee and Domaç (2003). They support the 
existence of strong correlation between the growth of monetary aggregates and 
inflation in Turkey. According to Bahmani-Oskooee and Domaç (2003), central 
banks can eliminate inflation by interfering with monetary aggregates, 
particularly, the monetary base. However, it is noted that the supported correlation 
between money and prices is not an indicator of the direction of causality. In 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Domaç (2003) the external shocks followed by exchange 
rate depreciations, changes in public sector prices, and inflationary inertia are all 
found to be factors influencing inflation in Turkey.  
 In 1970s, it is observed that the changes in the growth of money are divided 
into two different groups; anticipated and unanticipated, since they are observed to 
have different effects. Briefly, anticipated monetary expansions were found to 
have inflation tax effects and cause inflation cost on nominal interest rates while 
                                                 
12
 In the set of the measures for money and credit quantity aggregates in James (1999), there are 
variables named FMFBA (monetary base, adj for reserve requirement changes, seasonally 
adjusted)) and FMBASE (monetary base, adj for reserve requirement changes, seasonally 
adjusted). 
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unanticipated monetary expansions were concluded to cause a probable rise in 
production. However, Lucas(1996) claims: “But I think it is clear that none of the 
specific models that captured this distinction in the 1970s can now be viewed as a 
satisfactory theory of business cycles”. 
An exogenous shock in the form of unanticipated price adjustments that do 
not hit the inflation target of central bank fosters nominal demand for money 
following the increase in consumer price index (CPI). When there is no 
persistency of inflation in the economy, central bank can solve this problem by 
increasing the supply of base money. On the contrary, if the economy faces 
persistent inflation, then the inflationary expectation of the public may grow 
which can be followed by an increase in wages and non-tradable goods prices. 
Hence, for high inflationary countries, an exogenous shock may result in inflation 
and monetary base growth (Bahmani-Oskooee and Domaç, 2003). As a result, it 
can be concluded that the relationship among inflation and economic 
fundamentals could differ across countries with different inflation levels. 
In addition, the literature on determinants of inflation suggests different 
groups of determinants of inflation for industrialized and emerging market 
economies one by one. As summed up in Domaç (2004); while the main 
determinants of inflation in industrialized countries consists of real factors, in 
emerging markets nominal factors are found to be good at explaining inflation. 
Especially in emerging economies, the exchange rate is an important 
variable in explaining inflation. Domaç (2004) states: “The pass-through of 
depreciation into domestic prices in these countries could be much larger than the 
share of imported goods in the consumption basket would indicate. This is 
 13 
because an increase in the price of imports in the face of depreciation would also 
affect inflation expectations”. According to Domaç (2004), increases in inflation 
expectations can be followed by exchange rate depreciation since the monetary 
authority buys foreign currency to keep purchasing power stable.   
While considering the determinants of inflation we came across with some 
studies modeling inflation with lagged inflation. These studies are all considering 
the persistency of inflation and the inflation inertia on the base of Phillips curve. 
In Céspedes, et al. (2003) inflation inertia is pointed out to be a delayed and 
gradual response of inflation to monetary policy shocks, while inflation 
persistence is defined as long-lasting, steady-state deviations of inflation after a 
monetary policy shock. 
The model of Céspedes, et al. (2003) considers slow (inertial) and prolonged 
(persistent) change in inflation following a permanent or highly persistence 
monetary policy shock (for instance, permanent changes in the inflation rate 
target). Rather than slow response of marginal cost to these shocks, this model 
supports the long-run or inflation updating component of firms’ pricing policies as 
the reason for inflation inertia or persistency in inflation.  
Another study, which considers the change in inflation and economy, is 
Fischer and Modigliani (1980): “Depending on two major factors, the effects of 
inflation can vary enormously. First, one is the institutional structure of the 
economy; and the second one is the extent which inflation is or is not fully 
anticipated. Because the institutional structure of the economy adapts to ongoing 
inflation, the real effects (and costs) of inflation can be expected to vary, not only 
among different economies, but also in the same economy”. This comment 
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supports our consideration of the role of institutional structure, especially the 
structure of financial markets. Indeed, we are expecting that the change in the 
structure of financial markets (namely, development level of financial markets in 
our model) has an effect on the inflationary process, and the impact of economic 
fundamentals on inflation. 
The effects of financial markets on inflation have also been studied in the 
literature. There are some studies about the effect of the financial system on the 
relationship between interest rates and inflation (or output). According to La Porta 
et al. (1996 and 1997) the character of the financial markets in a country depends 
on the legal structure of that country. Cecchetti (1999) then goes on to argue that a 
country’s legal system affecting the structure of financial markets forms the basis 
for the impact of monetary policy on output and prices. Hence, Cecchetti (1999) 
supports that the legal system in a country, financial and monetary structure are 
linked to each other. While studying effects of introducing euro, Cecchetti (1999) 
finds empirically that the impact of an interest rate change on output and inflation 
is low for countries with better legal protection for shareholders and debtors in EU 
countries. Therefore, the impact of the interest rate changes on output and 
inflation can be determined by the state of the countries’ financial systems. 
Among others, the study that forms the basis of ours is Neyaptı (2003). 
According to Neyaptı (2003), inflation can be modeled dynamically as a function 
of its first lag, budget deficits, the rate of growth of base money, and the rate of 
growth of real GDP in addition to a variable that measures both central bank 
independence (CBI) and FMD. It is concluded  that budget deficits have a 
significant positive effect on inflation. Moreover, it is stated that budget deficits 
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lead to inflation primarily when the central bank is not independent and the 
financial market is not developed enough in Neyaptı (2003). That is, this study 
also supports the important role played by institutions in the relationship between 
economic fundamentals and inflation. 
 
2.1.3 Recent Studies on Modeling Inflation 
 We next examine some recent studies which models inflation with 
different, mostly country specific variables.  
Among other studies on inflation inertia, Lim and Papi (1997) support that 
inertial factors are quantitatively important in explaining inflation in Turkey. 
Moreover, they find that monetary variables such as money or real exchange rate 
direct the inflationary process of Turkey. Domaç (2004) supports these findings 
for Turkey by stating: “The empirical findings show that infationary pressures in 
Turkey have their origin in the following factors: (i) the presence of external 
shocks which engender sharp exchange rate depreciations; (ii) changes in public 
sector prices; and (iii) inflationary inertia”. 
It is emphasized in Liu and Olumuyiwa (2000) that the dynamic 
specification of inflation in Iran can be represented in terms of excess money 
supply, changes in exchange premium13, monetary growth (i.e. nominal money  
                                                 
13
 This term, calculated by subtracting weighted average official exchange rate from the parallel 
market rate, is added to control the effect of exchange liberalization in Iran on inflation. Weighted 
average official exchange rate is used as a measure of the degree of exchange restrictions in Iran 
where a depreciation in the weighted average exchange rate means a relaxation of the exchange 
rate control.  
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growth), and lagged variable of the rate of inflation (which is used as to measure 
inflation expectation). This model differs from similar ones because it takes into 
account the disequilibria in markets for foreign exchange, money, and goods. For 
Iran, it is empirically supported that excess money supply, lagged inflation rate, 
and nominal money growth all have positive significant effect on inflation. In 
addition, changes in exchange premium variable is found to be negatively 
significant, which means an ease in exchange control results in an increase in 
inflation. 
Rother (2000) models the inflation in Albania with the help of the change in 
relative prices. Basic concern of Rother (2000) was the impact of relative price 
changes (at the level of individual goods) on inflation in transition economies like 
Albania. He claims that the asymmetry in relative price adjustments has a 
significant effect on inflation and proves empirically that positively skewed 
individual price adjustments has an upward pressure on inflation. Rother (2000) 
modeled change in logarithm of price level with the help of money supply, real 
income, level of interest rates (i.e. the return of the money balances rather than 
opportunity costs), depreciation of domestic costs, the world market price level, 
and the skewness on inflation. He empirically finds that money supply has a 
positive impact on price level. 
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2.2 Capital Flows: Their Effects and a Comparison with Aid  
Since foreign aid is a form of capital flow, its effects are expected to be 
similar to those of capital flows. For this reason, we will briefly discuss the effects 
of capital flows and aid flows on the economy, separately.  
Almost all authorities agree that globalization serves as a catalyst for major 
changes in today’s world. The tremendous increase in the mobility of international 
capital is just one single unit in this whole bunch of changes. In the nineties, sharp 
decrease in official capital flows and an increase in private investment, 
particularly portfolio capital was evident. The net private capital flows to 
emerging markets in 1996 is seven times larger than the one in 1990 by Kohli 
(2001). That is why the degree of  international capital mobility facing developing 
countries has been a major topic. While the results of individual studies vary, the 
most common conclusion is that there is high and growing international especially 
for many developing countries14.  
The studies about capital inflows generally state that it affects the recipient 
economy through its effects on exchange rates, interest rates, foreign exchange 
reserves, domestic monetary conditions as well as savings and investment. Some 
examples of such studies are Calvo et al. (1993), Chuhan, et al. (1993), Khan and 
Reinhart (1995), Gunther, et al. (1996), Gruben and McLeod (1996), Kamin and 
Wood (1998), Borensztein, et al. (1998), Bosworth and Collins (1999), Edwards 
                                                 
14
 See Prasad, et al. (2004), Willet, et al. (2002), and Haque and Montiel (1991) for the discussions 
about the measurement of capital mobility. Willet, et al. (2002) claim that the capital mobility is 
not so high as indicated by other studies, such as Haque and Montiel (1991). 
 18 
(1999), Carkovic and Levine (2002), Alfaro, et al. (2004), among others15. 
Celasun et al. (1999) questioned the experience of capital flows to Turkey and 
state that capital flows contributed to economic growth through their impact on 
private consumption and investment, but also rendered monetary policy 
ineffective and inflation path unchecked, given particularly policy mix of real 
exchange rate targeting and high fiscal deficits. 
Kohli (2001), undertaking an empirical study about the capital flows to 
India, gives opportunity to understand the mechanism behind this capital inflows 
and its effects system. According to him, an inflow of foreign capital results in an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate by increasing domestic expenditure and 
then raising the demand for nontradable goods16. The process goes on with an 
adjustment of prices which leads to a reallocation of resources from tradable to 
non-tradable goods and a consumption shift to nontradable. Moreover, since 
aggregate expenditure increases as domestic one does, the demand for tradable 
also increases. This leads to a rise in imports and a widening of the trade deficit. 
Kohli (2001) goes on with mentioning the importance of the exchange rate regime 
on the appreciation17. As he states, while the appreciation occurs through a 
nominal appreciation in a regime with a floating exchange rate and no central 
                                                 
15
 While Calvo et al. (1993) and Edwards (1999) claim that capital flows contribute to both real 
appreciation and reserve money accumulation in Latin American countries, Kohli (2001) supports 
the reconsideration of this point since he believes that there are some other factors, different than 
capital flows, affecting the fluctuations in real exchange rates. 
16
 The same reasoning is applied to effects of aid studied by many researchers. In addition, 
although it is not stated directly as “Dutch Disease”, the symptoms indicated are the same.  
17
 Dornbusch (1976) studies the exchange rate dynamics in detail and supports an immediate 
depreciation of the exchange rate in the short run, following a monetary expansion. This accounts 
for fluctuations in the exchange rate and the terms of trade. During the adjustment process, 
Dornbusch (1976) states that “Rising prices may be accompanied by an appreciation in exchange 
rate so that the trend behavior of exchange rates stands potentially in strong contrast with the 
cyclical behavior of exchange rates and prices”. Dornbusch (1976) also adds that the current level 
of exchange rate is directly linked to the expectations about the future path of economy. 
 
 19 
bank intervention, it occurs through an increase in the domestic money supply, 
aggregate demand and the prices of nontradable in a regime with fixed exchange 
rate. In addition, it can also be said that when the exchange rate regime is a pure 
float without intervention by the central bank, the net increase in capital assets 
following capital inflows can be associated with a similar increase in imports as 
well as current account deficit, and there is no impact on domestic money supply. 
If the exchange rate regime is fixed and the central bank intervenes instead, then 
increases in foreign exchange reserves (which affect the monetary base) can be 
directly attached to capital inflows. However, these two regimes are rarely 
observed in today’s world while the policy choice of today’s authorities becomes 
to a decision of the size of intervention which is directly related to the degree of 
exchange rate flexibility18.  
Buffie et al. (2004) argue large capital inflows may cause rapid monetary 
expansion under managed exchange rate regimes. Initial response to capital flows 
comes from central bank by foreign exchange intervention which includes mostly 
sterilization of these inflows. However, foreign reserve accumulation results in an 
expanded monetary base which generates fear of inflation and “overheating”. 
Moreover, bond sales as an instrument of sterilization can increase real interest 
rates. Calvo et al. (1994) observe that bond sales prevent interest rate differentials 
from falling. Shadler (1993) also supports the unusefulness of sterilization when 
                                                 
18
 Many markets, especially emerging markets, which have suffered from severe crises of bank or 
currency, still follow non-floating exchange rate regimes, although they have announced they will 
allow their exchange rate to float. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) acknowledge that as a result of lack 
of credibility; liability to dollarization and limitation on central bank’s ability as an effective 
lender, fear of floating, volatile interest rates, and procyclical interest rate policies emerge in 
countries which are decided to enter international capital markets. If credibility is not achieved, 
expectations will lead the day. As Goldstein (2000) suggests, if countries manage to have either 
hard pegs or floating exchange rates, speculative attacks and currency crises will disappear. 
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the inflows are persistent. When the inflow is persistent, Buffie et al. (2004) 
suggest that “There is little to recommend a delayed real exchange rate 
adjustment. Monetary management should concentrate, instead, on avoiding short-
run volatility around the new overshooting of real exchange rate, a burst of 
inflation, a slump in real activity, or a run-up in the real exchange rate.” When the 
inflow is temporary, however, Calvo, et al. (1995) and Prati, et al. (2003) both 
support targeting the real exchange rate, letting inflation and/or the real interest 
rate increase in order to prevent adverse effects of a temporary real appreciation. 
According to Nuti (1996), the countries have been affected by capital flows 
similarly no matter what the regime is: initial gross undervaluation followed by 
rapid real revaluation. Interest rate differentials, higher than domestic currency 
devaluations, made foreign investment in domestic financial assets particularly 
attractive. Hence, these differentials caused large-scale capital inflows which are 
either inflationary or costly to sterilize (which the author calls embrass de 
richesse). Nuti (1996) declares that capital inflows or trade surpluses may ease the 
external constraint and attract potential investment and increase growth. On the 
other side, he believed that sooner or later huge capital inflows resulted either in 
an expansionary effect on money supply, which is inflationary, or in an obligation 
to take curing actions but which are indirectly or directly costly19. These actions 
reported in Nuti (1996) are revaluation, fiscal surpluses for offsetting reserve 
growth, costly sterilizations through open market operations, an interest rate 
reduction, capital controls, trade liberalization, widening exchange rate bands20. 
                                                 
19
 See Schadler et al. (1993) and Montiel (1995) for details of these costs. 
20
 See Nuti (1996) for the explaination of possible results of all these actions.  
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According to Acharya (1999), the preferable policy response is to allow a nominal 
appreciation adjustment through gradual increases in domestic inflation. In 
addition, creating capital outflows through early servicing of external debt can be 
the part of the policy response, too. Here, it is better to note that there are some 
studies which state that differences in policy responses may affect the magnitude 
of real appreciation. For instance, Glick (1998) claims that the difference in the 
extent of real exchange rate appreciation in the Asian region and Latin American 
countries can be explained by the differences in policy response.  
There are some studies that shed light on the relation between capital flows 
and aid inflows. The earliest studies deal with their impact on growth. For 
instance, Papanek (1973) find that aid inflows have a greater impact on growth 
than either savings or private capital inflows. Dowling and Hiemenz (1982) show 
that private capital inflows affect growth more than official inflows, whereas 
Singh (1985) supports domestic savings’ effectiveness on fostering growth 
compared to aid.  
Although private capital flows have received no attention during the 
discussions of aid management, recently, Buffie et al. (2004) study the link 
between official aid flows and private capital flows. According to Buffie et al. 
(2004), persistent official capital flows is related to strength of private portfolio 
substitution. Buffie et al. (2004) suggest that: “African central banks have been 
correct to intervene substantially in the face of recent increases in aid, and to 
discount the argument that rapid domestic liquidity expansion necessarily calls for 
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a combination of bond sterilization and cleaner floating”21. Indeed, they support 
central bank’s strict attitude towards preventing nominal appreciation and its 
overwhelming effort to control liquidity by selling bonds when large and 
persistent aid inflow to a low-income country. Moreover, to manage this kind of 
inflows, they suggest a heavily managed float with little or no sterilization and add 
that  under managed float “ ...the central bank uses unsterilized foreign exchange 
intervention to target the modest real appreciation needed to absorb the aid inflow. 
Real interest rates then stay low and macroeconomic adjustment is rapid.” If the 
central bank’s effort to control liquidity results in rapid nominal money growth, 
then it can be concluded that a large and persistent aid inflow is followed by a 
substantial increase in real money demand. Buffie et al. (2004) empirically show 
that a persistent aid inflow to a post-stabilization low-income country brings down 
expected seignorage and expected inflation, therefore cause a large increase in 
demand of real money.  
On the other hand, under crawling peg, Buffie et al. (2004) state that a short-
run spike in inflation can happen but this spike can be precluded by bond 
sterilization if the cost of rapidly increasing interest burden is acceptable. The 
results for pure float is worse. As Buffie et al. (2004) tell: “Portfolio pressures 
produce a nominal appreciation that is an order of magnitude larger than the 
required real appreciation, and unless the prices of nontraded goods are perfectly 
flexible, the real exchange rate overshoots and substitution effects produce a 
potentially deep recession”. 
                                                 
21
 However, if central banks intervene then they are in agreement with the argument indicated. 
Hence, they do not discount that argument. 
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2.3. Explaining Aid 
The voluminous literature about the effects of aid on recipient economy have 
mainly studied the relation of aid and economic growth, real exchange rates, 
savings, government spending, investment, competitiveness, exports and imports; 
overall, fiscal, monetary and trade policies. Of these studies, our focus will mainly 
be on the nominal effects of aid, i.e. real exchange rate, interest rate, and inflation. 
These effects are related to Dutch Disease. Furthermore, since these nominal 
effects occur simultaneously with the real effects, we will also touch up on the 
largest portion of the aid literature: aid effectiveness and aid-growth relation. 
Although there are some studies on inflationary or deflationary effects22 of aid, to 
the best of our knowledge, the literature presents no example of an empirical study 
in which inflation is explained by aid. Thus, investigating this relationship is one 
of the contributions of this study to the literature.  
Before discussing the literature related to inflation and aid, the definition of 
aid, and a historical perspective on aid will be provided in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, 
respectively. This discussion will be followed by section 2.3.3 where 
macroeconomic effects of foreign aid, especially aid and growth relationship is 
considered. Section 2.3.4 is divided into two subsections: section 2.3.4.1: Aid and 
Real Exchange Rate, section 2.3.4.2: Aid and the Dutch Disease.  
                                                 
22
 Younger (1992) states; following large aid inflows to Ghana, the increase in aggregate demand 
for Ghanian goods will begin to drive prices up, fostering the inflation’s persistance in Ghana. In 
contrast, Roemer (1989) (see also Clement, 1989 and Goreux, 1990) points out that there is a fairly 
large literature on food aid which argues deflationary impact of food aid. In Buffie et al. (2004), a 
persistent aid inflow in post-stabilization low-countries is observed to reduce expected inflation.  
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2.3.1 Definition of Aid 
In World Bank (1998) the difference between official development 
assistance and official development finance is described as: “The first (official 
development assistance) is a subset of the second and comprises the grants plus 
concessional loans that have at least a 25 percent grant component. Official 
development finance is all financing that flows from developed country 
governments and multilateral agencies to the developing worlds. Some of this 
financing is at interest rates close to commercial rates.” Following, it is reported 
that “Foreign aid is usually associated with official development assistance and 
normally targeted to the poorest countries”. 
Aid can be defined in a more compact approach as transfer of resources or 
income from a donor country or an international agency to another country 
(usually to a less-developed country) to achieve predetermined objectives. These 
economic objectives can be listed as:  
- Improving Economic Growth : In today’s world, it is hardly possible for 
many people to meet her/his daily needs like food or sheltering. With the help of 
aid, a donor can provide support government in lower-income countries to 
improve their levels of income. As reported in World Bank (1998), fostering 
growth helps the improvement of per capita incomes and social indicators, as a 
result, improvement in life expectancy, school enrollment, infant mortality, and 
child malnutrition. That is, an increase in income of the poor gives opportunity to 
ameliorate their health, education, and living standards. Moreover, lessening of 
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poverty can be achieved since the factors contributing to long-term growth, such 
as improved education, boost the reduction of poverty as well23. In addition, 
rehabilitating the economies of war-devastated countries can be another point in  
- Improving Agriculture: Agricultural development is one of the most 
important tools of increasing productivity and trade in a country. Besides, farmers 
and livestock producers are responsible for most of the food supply to consume 
and export in a country24.  
- Improving Education and Training: More than 900 million adults are not 
able to read and write, primarily in developing countries. More than 125 million 
children who should be in school are not. Aid in this area can help for rising living 
standards of people by increasing the number of literates. 
- Improving Global Health: Donors are assisting in this area to save lives, 
prevent epidemic fatal diseases like HIV/AIDS or Hepatitis, and create a brighter 
future for people in the developing world25. 
- Protecting Natural Resources: Growing populations are consuming and 
polluting growing amounts of natural resources day by day. In order to maintain 
the supply of their basic needs to live, the nine billion people that the world is 
expected to have by 2050 will certainly in need of these resources.  
                                                 
23
 See Collier and Dollar (1999) for the efficient allocation of aid (under the assumption that aid 
has no effect on policy) to reduce poverty. Moreover, in the World Bank report Assesing Aid 
(1998), it is reported: “A $10 billion increase in aid would lift 25 million people out of poverty –
but only if it favors countries with sound economic management. By contrast, an across-the-board 
increase of  $10 billion would lift only 7 million people out of their hand-tomouth existence.” It is 
claimed in this report that 1 percent of GDP in assistance leads to 1 percent decline in poverty in 
country with sound economic management. 
24
 In World Bank (1998), the share of agriculture  in GDP is used as a measure of development and 
it is supported empirically that countries that have a larger share of GDP for agriculture are 
relatively less developed and have relatively less government spending. See Pack and Pack (1990) 
for an empirical study on aid and agricultural expenditure relation. 
25
 For instance, there are programs under UN to prevent such illnesses. The Global Fund for Aids 
is an example for these programs. 
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Donors could also provide aid for strategic interests and political reasons. 
However, due to the economic focus of this study we will not detail them. 
Foreign aid can be divided into two groups: bilateral (from one country to 
another) or multilateral (from international financial institutions to countries). As 
reported in World Bank (1998), bilateral aid is directed by donor agencies, such as 
U.S. Agency for International Development of Overseas Economic Cooperation 
of Japan. Some donor countries giving bilateral aid put an obligation on recipient 
to acquire goods and services from the donor. This type of bilateral assistance is 
called “tied”. Besides, Multilateral aid is distributed through international 
agencies, such as United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank 
or International Monetary Fund, and it is accumulated by contributions of wealthy  
countries.  
Aid can be in the form of money, goods, services or technical assistance. It 
may be given as a grant, without repayment obligation, or as loans which will be 
repaid at lower rates and over longer periods than commercial bank loans (World 
Bank, 1998). 
 
2.3.2 History of Foreign Aid 
Aid has been shown as driven by the donor’s political or commercial 
interest26. Then, gifts from one king to another in classical times should be 
encountered as aid too. However, since we defined aid as a general benefit to 
                                                 
26
 See Alesina and Dollar (1998); they found that the pattern of aid giving is affected by political 
and strategic considerations, indeed. 
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population of the recipient country we can omit the classical times while we are 
interesting in history of aid. 
According to Moger (1999), all economic assistance was used to fund wars 
in the beginning. He declares “The only foreign aid, if one could call it that, 
dispersed by French economist Jacques Necker, studied during French Revolution 
years, was to the colonists in the New World who were fighting a rebellion against 
France’s enemy: England”. Another point in time of aid history is related to 
Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century. After the revolution, England 
became the richest country in the world also which became the richest donor. 
England supported India to build railroads not only to support the industrial 
development of India but also to connect cotton industry and the armed forces in 
India. 
As stated in Hjertholm and White (2000), the roots of aid can be traced as 
far back as the nineteenth century. The Act for the Relief of the Citizens of 
Venezuela in 1812 and in 1896, the beginning of the transfer of United States 
(U.S.) food surplus for the development of new markets are the two events at the 
beginning of US aid history. First discussion of official finance for colonies under 
Chamberlain in 1870s and first Colonial Development Act in 1929 are mentioned 
in the early years of U.K. assistance. Foreign aid in U.S. is reported to begin 
(1941) during World War II with lend-lease. U.S. foreign aid was in the form of 
grants which were planned to be used for the reconstruction projects of the 
postwar world. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IRBD; also known as the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) were the sources of loans for these projects. After the formation of United 
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Nations (UN) in 1942, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) was established in 1943 to provide funds for postwar 
reconstruction. UNRRA, a large proportion of the funds of which were provided 
by U.S., spent $4 billion for reconstruction. The Marshall Plan was announced in 
1947 by George C. Marshall as a result of little UNRRA aid to Western Europe. 
Marshall Plan, known as the European Recovery Program, distributed over $12 
billion from 1948 to 1951. In 1956, the Soviet Union’s aid program to the 
underdeveloped nations was announced. Soviet aid reached over $6 billion by 
1966 and it was generally in the form of technical and economic assistance with 
low-interest loans. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American rationale 
for foreign aid has become politically more vulnerable. 
As White (1992)27 states; “Aid has grown dramatically in the post-war 
period, increasing by 4.2 percent per annum in real terms over the period 1960-88, 
to reach nearly US $70 billion by 1988. In 1988 prices and exchange rates almost 
US$ 1.4 trillion (thousand billion) has been disbursed during the last three 
decades”28. Like cold war times29, a large proportion of the foreign aid is shifted 
from economic to military assistance today. However, according to U.S. Agency 
for International Development, the Agency for International Development and the 
Export-Import Bank still provides loans for economic development.  
                                                 
27
 White (1992) basically study aid’s macroeconomic and microeconomic impact on economic 
growth by introducing the macro-micro paradox of Mosley(1986).  
28
 When recent data is examined (Source: World Development Indicators Online), while in 1970 
world wide aggregate official development assistance is 6.9 billion US$, in mid 1990s, jumps up to 
68 billion US$. 
29
 During the period of cold war, U.S. foreign aid to Western Europe shifted from economic to 
military assistance. 
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While Japan was the world's largest foreign aid donor, followed by U.S., 
France, and Germany in the 1990s; in 2001, U.S. became the world's largest aid 
donor as a result of Japanese cutbacks in foreign aid. In addition, U.S. uses a third 
of its total assistance to Egypt and Israel; Japan’ s aid goes to the countries which 
vote identically with Japan in UN meetings; France gives aid to its former 
colonies (Alesina and Dollar, 1998). Recently, in 2004, the U.S. began the 
Millennium Challenge aid program. Today, about 15% of foreign aid is provided 
by international institutions like the World Bank (or IRBD), IMF, the 
International Development Association, and the International Finance 
Corporation; regional development banks; the European Development Fund; the 
UN Development Program; and specialized agencies of the UN, such as the Food 
and Agriculture Organization30. Although it is stated in Burnside and Dollar 
(1997) and in Bulir 
and Lane (2002) that the support for aid within rich countries been declined in 
recent years, the recent G8 summit held in June 2005 ended with an agreement to 
boost aid for developing countries by $50 billion (£28.8 billion) which means an 
increase in aid to GDP ratio of rich countries. 
 
2.3.3 Macroeconomic Effects of Foreign Aid: Aid and Growth 
Due to the main objective of aid, which is to increase the welfare of the 
population of the recipient nation, the impact of aid on the level of national 
income, growth and income distribution are the most studied areas in the 
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 See, “Foreign Aid National Interest Report: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity,” 
U.S. Agency for International Development (2002). 
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literature. During this section, first, discussions and different approaches about the 
aid and growth relationship are going to be introduced. In the last part of this 
section, the focus will be on nonlinear models of growth in this literature 
including policy restrictions and aid interaction term, as well as the quadratic term 
of aid. 
In White (1992) it is emphasized that some writers believe that the objective 
of increasing welfare is only a façade. For some writers on the left, the purpose of 
aid is spreading capitalism and support for political motives of the neo-classical 
powers and so they conclude, with other critics on left, that aid hurts rather than 
helps the poor (White, 1992). In addition, according to Burnside and Dollar 
(1997), the left believes that agencies have enforced structural adjustment policies 
on recipient countries but policies have not delivered the promised benefits, while 
the right believes aid supports large and inefficient governments that create bad 
environment for economic structure. White (1992) says critics from the right 
either see aid as an indefensible extension of the power of the state, supporting 
bureaucratic centralized states against the interests of economic development, or 
as a legitimate, but unsuccessful, attempt to procure political support from the 
developing world. However, as Burnside and Dollar (1997) conclude, both the 
right and the left were wrong in the period 1970-93 since foreign aid had no 
systematic impact on the economic policies that effect growth; strong positive 
effect on growth happened only in a habitat with both aid and good policies.   
Some studies on aid and growth relation supports that a very large portion of 
foreign aid is wasted and has no effect on the recipient country’s growth, 
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investment, and macroeconomic policies (Jepma, 1997; Boone,1994 and 1996)31. 
Hansen and Tarp (2001), however, find a one-to-one relation between increased 
aid flows and increased investment, and their results confirm the existence of a 
relationship between aid, investment, and growth which is not dependent on good 
policy. On the other hand, there are some studies saying that the production shift 
from traded goods to non-traded goods as a result of aid inflows will reduce the 
rate of technical progress and, hence the growth rate of the economy (de Melo, 
1988).  
While the above mentioned studies look into the direct effect of aid, with no 
consideration of possible effects across different environment, there are some 
studies which supports aid is beneficial, or not wasted, only when macroeconomic 
policy of the recipient is stable and appropriate (Burnside and Dollar, 1997). 
Collier and Dollar (1999) state that aid is more effective for countries with sound 
policies. Similarly, Tornell and Lane (1999) show weak institutional structure 
combined with fractionalization of the governing elite produce wasteful spending 
of aid inflows. In Burnside and Dollar (2000), it is stated that aid is beneficial to 
real GDP growth if recipient government has good economic policies, such as 
those good at decreasing inflation, budget deficits and increasing trade openness. 
Due to this “ if ” part influencing the aid-growth relation, studies on aid’s impact 
conditional on different factors like macroeconomic policy (Burnside and Dollar, 
1997 and 2000), geography (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp, 
2002), local financial markets (Favara, 2003; Nkusu and Sayek, 2004), external 
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 Before these studies, Pearson (1969) acknowlge that there is no correlation between aid and 
growth. However, the absence of correlation is irrelavant when causality is studied.  
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shocks (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Mosley, 1980) and on the role of 
government policy (Dowling and Hiemenz, 1982), savings and taxes (White, 
1992; Bowles, 1987), investment (Levy, 1987; Chaudhuri, 1978) or 
competitiveness (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005a; Rajan and Zingales, 1998), 
emerged. 
Recipient country’s situation and foreign aid relation is also discussed by 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005b) with a new perspective to explain aid-growth 
relation with their instrumentation strategy. Their instrumentation strategy is 
crucial since, as they stated, aid may go to countries currently suffering from a 
natural disaster which would explain a negative correlation between aid and 
growth or it may go to ex-aid receivers who have used it well before which 
implies, if growth is persistent, there will be a positive correlation between aid and 
growth. That is, there may be a negative or positive correlation between aid and 
growth but this would not reflect the causation from aid to growth. Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005b) find no significant evidence that aid works better in better 
policy or institutional or geographical environments, or that certain types of aid 
work better. Besides, Easterly (2001) argues that neither good policies nor 
exogenous shocks can explain much of the poor growth performance in 
developing countries. On the contrary, Burnside and Dollar (1997), Roodman 
(2004), and  Clemens et al. (2004) find that aid affects growth. In order to explain 
this unrobust relation of aid and growth White (1992) introduces the macro-micro 
paradox of Mosley (1986) which states that “Even though summaries of micro-
level evaluations have been, by large, positive those of the macro evidence are, at 
best, ambiguous”. White (1992) also states that if aid either allows government 
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expenditure to be redirected into non-productive activities (that is, it crowds out 
public investment) or crowds out private activity then it may have little or no 
impact on the level or rate of growth of national income. Younger(1992) also adds 
that aid usually can not be used to acquire foreign assets, even though some 
private inflows could be offset by private foreign asset purchases.  
Another growth-aid relation study is Bulir and Lane (2002) arguing aid 
promotes economic growth since the recipient country is able to finance more 
rapid accumulation of capital. They substitute the Harrod-Domar model (in which 
effectiveness of aid in contributing growth depends on the productivity of capital 
endogenous growth model) by the endogenous growth model and observe that this 
substitution causes aid to affect growth by aid’s usage of human capital. 
As reported in Lensink and White (2001), aid to developing countries has 
risen to large amounts during the last two decades. According to Lensink and 
White (2001), “Whereas in the late 1970s only eight countries had aid to GNP 
ratios in excess of 20 per cent, and none higher than 50 per cent, by the first half 
of the 1990s 26 countries had aid ratios of 20 per cent or more, with four countries 
having ratios greater than 50 per cent.” Morever, it is added in Lensink and White 
(2001) that “A greater number of countries can be classified as high aid recipients 
in the 1990s than was the case in the 1970s, and that there has emerged a class of 
very high aid recipients”. Since $50 billion boost for aid to developing countries 
was committed during the recent G8 summit held in 2005, this pattern seems to 
preserve its validity in the future.  
There are some theoretical and empirical works analyzing the effects of high 
aid inflows. It is believed that there exists a capacity for each country to absorb or 
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to manage further inflows of aid. The acceptance of such a limit point brings the 
notion of diminishing returns to aid as well. The World Bank report Assesing Aid 
supports that if an inflow of aid is above a certain amount, then it turns out to have 
negative effects on the recipient economy. Lensink and White (2000 and 2001) 
also support that this negative returns of further inflows of aid at high levels.  
The negative return of further inflows of aid after a certain level is in fact 
suggestive of an aid Laffer curve32. It represents the benefits from aid increase at 
initial stages, however decreasing after a certain level of aid inflow. Thereby, the 
aid Laffer curve supports that aid below a certain level is more beneficial for the 
recipient country.  
In Lensink and White (2001), the existence of an aid Laffer curve is 
confirmed. However, while modeling growth, Lensink and White (2001) observe 
that significance of the quadratic term of aid is quite sensitive to the countries 
included in the estimate. 
In the literature of growth and aid relation, Hadjimichael, et al. (1995), 
Durbarry et al. (1998), Lensink and White (1999 and 2001), Burnside and Dollar 
(1997 and 2000), Hansen and Tarp (2000 and 2001), and Nkusu and Sayek (2004) 
all build non-linear models to explain growth with the help of foreign aid. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) introduce an interaction term between aid and an 
index of economic policy, and support empirically that the interaction term of aid 
and policy has a threshold effect, which leads aid’s positive contribution to growth 
under good policy condition. In World Bank (1998), the estimated impact of aid in 
                                                 
32
 See Griffin (1970) or Lensink and White (1999 and 2001) for details. According to Griffin 
(1970), aid scales down the productivity of investment, therefore, if this effect is sufficiently large, 
then aid may contribute to decrease in growth. 
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country with good policies is found to be positively significant, and this 
conclusion is based on a growth model with a significant interaction term of aid 
and policy and insignificant aid term. On the other hand, although the estimated 
impact of aid with poor policy environment is found to be negative, it is not 
significant. Hadjimichael, et al. (1995), Durbarry et al. (1998), Lensink and White 
(1999) all include aid squared as a regressor in the growth model and find 
positive, but decreasing marginal returns to aid flows, that is, significantly positive 
aid term with a significantly negative aid squared term. In Lensink and White 
(2001), for instance, the quadratic term of aid is found to be significant when 
extreme outliers in the data set are omitted. Hansen and Tarp (2000), on the other 
hand, note that both squared aid and interaction terms can be included in the 
model as a second order approximation of standard Solow growth model. 
Following, the general model Hansen and Tarp (2001) include aid, aid squared, 
aid times policy index, and policy squared. Policy squared term and interaction 
term of aid and policy are not found to be significant. It is found that aid increases 
growth in any policy condition. The decreasing marginal returns of aid is captured 
by significantly negative coefficient of aid squared term. However, significancy of 
this term depends on the choice of estimators and control variables in the model of 
Hansen and Tarp (2001). 
Nkusu and Sayek (2004) study whether the development level of financial 
markets affects the effectiveness of aid on growth. It is stated that the choice of 
sterilization instruments as well as the volume and timing of sterilization becomes 
crucial because of its effect on interest rate and nominal exchange rate. Nkusu and 
Sayek (2004) add that while sterilization through sales of large foreign exchange 
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creates real exchange rate appreciation via the nominal exchange rate 
appreciation, the sterilization though treasury bills in a shallow domestic money 
market increases both level and volatility of domestic interest rate. At this point, 
the level of financial market development is used as a measure of the absorptive 
capacity of the domestic securities and foreign exchange markets. 
As stated in Nkusu and Sayek (2004) developed financial markets facilitate 
efficient allocation of financial resources and ease the monetary authorities’ 
control on monetary and exchange rate management, so as to reduce the possible 
negative effects of foreign aid on the economy. Moreover, as stated in Neyaptı 
(2003), developed financial markets which prefer extending credit to the private 
sector rather than the public sector, offer less inflationary opportunities to the 
central bank by allowing the central bank to generate maximum profits. The 
upward impact on domestic spending indicates only a small portion of overall 
effect of foreign aid on the recipient economy. The rest can be related to the 
changes in the level and variability of interest rates and real exchange rate, caused 
by increased domestic liquidity and foreign exchange availability, depending on 
the level of aid’s management by recipient authorities (Nkusu and Sayek, 2004). 
Nkusu and Sayek (2004) support empirically that financial market depth, an 
indicator of monetary authorities’ capacity to manage aid inflows, boost aid 
effectiveness. 
Following such studies, the effect of aid on the improvement of receiving 
countries’ policies is questioned. Bauer (1979) concludes that aid is an inefficient 
instrument for stimulating development in low-income countries and it played a 
significantly negative role in those countries by encouraging waste and corruption. 
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Likewise, Knack (2001) and Alesina and Weder (2002) support the hypothesis 
that aid levels decrease the quality of governance or increase corruption. On the 
contrary, Burnside and Dollar (1997) state that there has been a shift among 
developing countries in favor of better policies. Similarly, Alesina and Dollar 
(1998) show that aid encourages the adoption of democratization and openness.  
 
 
2.3.4 Aid and the Dutch Disease 
 We decide to divide this section into two; in section 2.3.4.1, we first 
review the relation of real exchange rate and aid, and in section 2.3.4.2, we link 
the real exchange appreciation to the “Dutch Disease” in the context of foreign aid 
literature. 
 
2.3.4.1 Aid and Real Exchange Rate 
Literature on aid provides many examples of the effects of aid on real 
exchange rate as well as the impact of it on growth. Among many of them, while 
Younger (1992) and Vos (1998) supported empirically the effect of aid inflows on 
real exchange rate appreciation, Nyoni (1998) found aid inflows to depreciate it. 
Moreover, Dijkstra and van Donge (2001) found no impact. De Melo (1988) 
suggests that aid over GDP ratios are neither unstable nor high enough for the real 
exchange rate to be affected significantly by foreign aid. However, as White 
(1992) explains; “…Whilst this may be true for large countries (such as India) or 
low aid recipients (mostly in South East Asia and Latin America), it is not so for 
most of Sub-Saharan Africa where aid is both high and unstable”.  
 38 
White (1992) goes on his explanation about aid effects with the model of the 
dependent economy in which capital is accepted to be sector specific, labor is 
mobile between sectors and relative price of non-traded goods is the real exchange 
rate, then the increase in the relative price of non-traded goods means a real 
appreciation33. The model supports the hypothesis of an increase in relative price 
of non-traded goods (which can also be stated as the appreciation in real exchange 
rate) as a result of spending some part of the aid inflows on them. Moreover, it is 
added that this appreciation pressure in the real exchange rate is greater when: (i) 
the marginal propensity to spend on non-traded goods is greater, (ii) their supply 
responsiveness is lower, (iii) the demand responsiveness to price changes is lower, 
or (iv) the policy coordination to sterilize aid is lower34. To consider the 
temporary behavior of aid inflows, a two-period process is designed for aid in 
White (1992). In the first period, an appreciation of real exchange rate followed 
by a shift of domestic resources from traded goods production to non-traded 
ones’. In the second period, aid flow is assumed to cease and the model takes 
account the shift of resources back into the traded goods sector. This depreciation 
in real exchange rate causes a welfare loss because of “learning by doing” in 
traded goods sector35.  
                                                 
33
 See van Wijnberg (1985 and 1986) and Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1989) for details. 
34
 This last statement is added by Bulir and Lane (2002) to White (1992)’s first three statements 
about the upward pressure on real exchange rate. 
35
 As Bulir and Lane (2002) express, the shift in production from tradables to nontradables rises 
the possibility of a loss of possitive extenalities associated by “learning and doing” or another kind 
of distortion. However, following this, the distortion should be dealt with rather than discouraging 
aid inflows. 
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As a result, White (1992) supports the policy response of subsidizing export 
production in the first period. van Wijnbergen (1984 and 1985), also concluded 
that larger aid inflows causes larger export subsidies.    
 
2.3.4.2 Dutch Disease 
In Nkusu and Sayek (2004), it is stated that the impact of aid on real 
exchange rate appreciation can be examined in the context of “Dutch Disease” 
problem. Furthermore, White (1992) and Arellano, et al. (2005) both acknowledge 
that large aid inflows in low income countries may present similar effects to 
Dutch Disease, i.e. the logic behind the two is similar. Dutch Disease was 
extended to the effects of foreign direct investment in transition and emerging 
economies, as well. 
The phrase “Dutch Disease” was first used during the discussions following 
the sudden discovery of large natural gas deposits in the Netherlands36. It is the  
adverse impact of the gains of natural resource discoveries on the manufacturing 
sector, linked to a real exchange rate appreciation as explained by Arellano, et al. 
(2005). Moreover, they define Dutch Disease as a transfer problem, which is 
believed to result in higher imports and lower exports associated with the 
appreciation of real exchange rate. Besides, Younger (1992) declares that: “The 
Dutch Disease refers to problems that a booming export sector causes to the rest 
                                                 
36
 See Corden (1984), Gelb (1980), Cordon and Neary (1982) or Torvik (2001) for the details in 
definition of Dutch Disease. Especially for empirical examples in Africa see Musanda and 
Luvanda (1991) or Younger (1999). 
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of the economy”37. Related with foreign aid, Bulir and Lane (2002) explain it as a 
decrease in the production of tradable goods of recipient country. 
Like a number of observers have mentioned, Arellano, et al. (2005) state 
that aid increases tradable’ s supply and, ceteris paribus, decreases their price. 
Following that, it increases the demand for and price of nontradable. This 
mechanism redirects factors of production towards the production sector of 
nontradable. In Nkusu and Sayek (2004) it is stated that consumption increases in 
both goods after the aid inflow. The increased demand for tradable can be satisfied 
by imports, without changing the structure of domestic production. As Younger 
(1992)38 also supports, the expenditure on imports creates no direct effect on the 
money supply or aggregate demand in the economy, i.e. the balance of payments 
shows a capital account and an offsetting current account deficit. However, 
demand for domestic goods and services create problems for macroeconomic 
management. As stated in Younger (1992), the increase in aggregate demand for 
Ghanaian goods will begin to drive prices up, fostering the inflation’s persistence 
in Ghana.  
At the same time, changing foreign exchange into local currency for making 
local purchases increases the money base. Moreover, as Nkusu and Sayek (2004) 
state, the increase in demand for nontradable can affect relative prices, 
international competitiveness, and the structure of domestic production since this 
type of increase would require a positive domestic supply response. Nkusu and 
Sayek (2004) state that if the price of nontradable increase but an excess capacity 
                                                 
37
 See Hill and Mokhethi (1989) or Cuddington (1989) for the details in temporary boom sector. 
38
 According to Younger (1992), capital from aid is spent on either imports or domestic goods and 
services. 
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or idle production factors exist in the economy, the real exchange rate would 
appreciate without an alteration in the domestic production structure damaging to 
tradable, particularly exportable. “In the absence of excess capacity, such an 
alternation would occur” as Nkusu and Sayek (2004) say. Note that the export 
industry of a low-income country is crucial for its growth performance since trade 
is theoretically studied to be the engine of growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997). 
Hence, more attention is now paid to studies about aid’s effects by way of 
decrease in exports rather than increase in imports.  
As stated before, large aid inflows make the consumers of the recipient 
country spend more on both tradable and non-tradable goods. The change in 
relative shares of both goods, however, depends on the elasticity assumptions 
(Bulir and Lane, 2002). The elasticity conditions determine the changes in the 
structure of economy and factor gains39 as well as the changes in the relative 
prices. Depending on the elasticity assumptions, aid can cause consumption shift40 
from tradable to non-tradable goods with higher relative price, or if it is used for 
investment in productive capacity that would not have been implemented in the 
absence of aid, it can cause Dutch disease (Bulir and Lane, 2002).  
                                                 
39
 See Bulir and Lane (2002) and White (1992) for details. Bulir and Lane (2002) say: “If capital 
and labor are free to move between sectors, the factor used intensively in the nontradable sector 
gains and the other factor loses; on the usual assumption that nontradable are more labor-intensive 
than tradable, economy-wide real wages rise and real returns real returns to capital fall. Suppliers 
of any factor of production that is specialized in nontradable -e.g. workers with specialized skills- 
tend to gain at the expense of specialized factors used in the tradable sector.” Moreover, the shift 
in consumption from traded goods to non-traded goods is related with the fungibality of aid in 
Bulir and Lane (2002). In the case of consuming aid as tradable, which can be assured or obligated 
by donors, if aid is fully fungible then the effect of aid is similar with the one described in 
quotation mark. 
40
 This shift was explained in a similar way of capital inflow consequences by Kohli (2001) and 
Buffie et al. (2004).  
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When the flow of aid is temporary, the structure of production and 
consumption is not required to adapt fully to the period of aid receiving. If the 
government suspects temporariness then ensuring saving rather than consuming is 
a preferable policy for the government. So the policy decision for temporary aid 
becomes where to invest: in foreign assets, domestic public assets, or domestic 
private assets. According to Younger (1992), the first option is the easiest and 
most practical since it not only saves the temporary income but also automatically 
sterilizes the impact on aggregate demand. Sterilization is achieved by offsetting 
the capital account credit directly while accumulating the foreign assets, and  no 
demand falls on domestic goods. Last but not least, it allows government’s 
reserves to strengthen by increasing foreign exchange stocks. According to Calvo, 
et al. (1995) and Prati, et al. (2003), when the inflow is temporary, targeting the 
real exchange rate, letting inflation and/or the real interest rate increase may help 
improving the welfare and preventing from “Dutch disease” or other adverse 
effects of a temporary real appreciation.  
When aid is permanent, however, the correct policy is to absorb the aid with 
increased imports according to Younger (1992). To achieve this, an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate is vital in an economy with free trade. However, the 
government can still prevent real appreciation by removing the controls so as to 
foster the demand of import through liberilization rather than a real appreciation, 
to the extent that import or foreign exchange controls exist41. On the other hand, 
for managing a large and persistent aid inflow, Buffie et al. (2004) suggest little or 
                                                 
41
 See Younger(1992) to examine the similar policy in Ghana where the real exchange rate has 
remained almost constant in recent years while import controls have been removed gradually. 
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no sterilization of increases in the monetary base as optimum short-run approach 
when the credibility of policymakers’ commitment to low inflation is firm. The 
combination of changes in inflation, nominal and real exchange rates, and real 
interest rates becomes the most important decision for policymakers to absorb aid 
shock according to Buffie et al. (2004). 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
3.1 The Methodology 
To investigate the relationship between foreign aid and inflation, while 
considering the impact of FMD on this relation, the panel data approach is used. 
In this section, the methodology based on a panel data approach is going to be 
explained.  
There are many benefits of panel data that motivates us during our study by 
expanding our opportunities. First of all, since it covers both time-series and 
cross-sectional data the size of the data set is obviously much larger. This situation 
is likely to produce more reliable parameter estimates, and most importantly, 
enables the researcher to study more complex and sophisticated models which 
incorporate less restrictive assumptions. The increase in sample size makes it 
possible to provide more information, more variability, less collinearity among the 
variables42, more efficiency and more degrees of freedom. One other crucial 
identity of panel data is its allowance for individual heterogeneity. Since we are 
studying a set of different countries, we should account for this country 
heterogeneity. Otherwise, our results may lead to serious misspecifications43. 
                                                 
42
 When the explanatory variables vary in two dimension they are less likely to be highly 
correlated. 
43
 See Hsiao (1985) for a detailed account of the benefits and limitations of panel data. 
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Moreover, it gives opportunity to study the dynamics of adjustment. With the help 
of dynamic panel approach, we can consider not only the contemporaneous 
relation between aid and inflation, but also dynamic characteristic of inflation. 
While modeling inflation, we primarily take into account the persistence of 
inflation. Thus, adding the first lag of the inflation variable into the model is the 
main reason for us to use dynamic panel data approach, indeed.  
Although panel data approach have many special feature that can not be 
managed neither by time-series nor by cross-country data approach, it has some 
limitations. For instance, data collection is an important problem for panel data44. 
We have missing values for each series, indeed. As a result, our panel data is 
unbalanced. 
The model we use during our study is given below:        
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    i = 1, ..., N;  t = m+1, ...., T i  
with i denoting individuals, in our case countries, and t denoting time. The i 
subscript, therefore, denotes the cross-section dimension whereas t denotes the 
time-series dimension. Then, N is the number of individuals, T i  is the length of 
time period for the i th country and m is the maximum lag length in the model. In 
addition, α  is a vector of scalars, )(Lβ  is a vector associated polynomials in the 
lag operator ( β  is Kx1), itx  is a vector of explanatory variables (i.e., the it th 
observation on K explanatory variables), iγ  denotes the unobservable individual 
specific effect, and itε  denotes the remainder disturbance.  
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 For other limitations like distortions of measurement errors, selectivity problems, and short time 
series dimension, see Baltagı (2003). 
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The number of time periods available for the i th country, T i , is assumed to 
be small while N is large. iγ  ~ IID(0, 2γσ ) and itε  ~ IID(0, 2εσ ) are independent 
of each other and among themselves. Autocorrelation due to the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable among the regressors and individual specific effects 
characterizing the heterogeneity among the individuals both make dynamic panel 
data approach problematic. For the fixed effects specification, the problem arises 
as a consequence of the relatively short time series component, typical of most 
panel data sets, which makes ordinary least square (OLS) estimators  biased 
(Nickel, 1981). In the random effects specification, generalized least estimators 
are biased since ity  and ktiy −,  is both a function of iγ , as a result, ktiy −,  is 
correlated with the error term itε  (Sevestre and Trognon, 1985). The most favored 
form of consistent estimation method for both fixed and random specifications is 
that of instrumental variables and generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimation. Among consistent estimators of GMM, like Anderson and Hsiano 
(1982), estimators proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) generally perform more 
efficiently. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a GMM estimator which optimally 
exploits all the linear moment restrictions linking to the assumption of no serial 
correlation in the errors, in an equation with individual effects, lagged dependent 
variables and no strictly exogenous variables 45. 
The estimation method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) that utilizes 
GMM and accommodates the use of an unbalanced panel data is facilitated during 
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 See Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Kiviet (1995), and Ahn and 
Schmidt (1995 and 1997) for more detail about dynamic panel data estimators. 
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our study. With the help of the computer software packages GiveWin2.1 and Ox 
Version 3.10 (see, Doornik, 2001 and Doornik, et al., 2002) we managed to test 
the hypothesis which are going to be introduced below and do appropriate GMM 
estimations on our unbalanced dynamic panel data model. The code facilitated 
during the analysis is based on the sample code named “abest1.ox” presented in 
Doornik, et al. (2002).  
The estimation method starts with taking first differencing of all variables in 
the model so as to remove the country specific fixed effects. As a result of this 
differencing procedure, degrees of freedom decreases by the number of cross-
section observations, N. Moreover, if the disturbances itε  are not serially 
correlated in the beginning, taking first differences cause differenced residuals 
(i.e. 1,
^^
−
− tiit εε ) to have significant negative first order serial correlation but no 
second order serial correlation. Here, instrumental variable technique, which is 
consistent when the lagged dependent variable with further lags of the same 
variable is instrumented, becomes the essential tool to overcome this serial 
correlation problem. Our set of instrumental variables consists of all explanatory 
variables, except the first lag of the dependent variable (the real rate of 
depreciation), and GMM-type instruments consist of dependent variable from lag 
2 to 99.  
The use of too many instruments may result in overfitting biases. The 
validity of extra instruments in levels equations and moment conditions of the 
residual term can be tested using Sargan tests. The Sargan test is the only test that 
is based on the two-step GMM estimator and is heteroskedasticity consistent. The  
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null hypothesis of Sargan test is: 
Ho:  The instruments are valid 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it can be concluded with the accepted 
level of confidence that the instruments are valid. The test statistic is 
asymptotically distributed as Chi-Square with as many degrees of freedom as 
overidentifying restrictions under the null. 
The other test we consider during our study is the AR(m) tests which are 
used to test serial correlation of order m. As we mentioned before, since we are 
taking first differences of serially uncorrelated errors, itε , E( itε 1, −tiε ) need not to 
be zero, but the consistency of GMM estimators depends on the satisfaction of the 
assumption that E( itε 2, −tiε ) is equal to zero. Hence, there should be evidence of 
significant negative first order serial correlation in the differenced residuals but no 
evidence of second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Then, the 
null hypothesis of AR(m) tests is: 
Ho:  No serial correlation of order m in the error term (consistency of estimators)   
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then there exists serial correlation of order 
m. DPD reports both the tests for the absence of 1st and 2nd order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals.  Our main concern is the lack of 
second-order serial correlation in the first difference residuals. If the null of 
second-order serial correlation is not rejected then errors in the model can 
concluded to be both uncorrelated and random walk in levels. In Arellano and 
Bond (1991), this test is called 2m  test. The test statistic is asymptotically 
distributed N(0,1) under the null hypothesis.  
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The last test we are interested in is the Wald test. It can be used to test any 
group of explanatory variables’ significance in the model. The Wald (joint) test 
statistics represented in the tables is based on all explanatory variables. The null 
hypothesis of Wald (joint) test is : 
Ho:  The coefficients of all explanatory variables are equal to zero (i.e. β  = 0) 
Then, by rejecting the null, it can be concluded that at least one explanatory 
variable in the model is statistically significant. Similarly, the null hypothesis of 
Wald (dummy) tests the significance of dummies (including the constant term if 
we attain constant term in the dummies set). In addition, Wald (Aid aid*iprvtcred) 
tests the joint significance of term Aid with term aid*iprvtcred, while and Wald 
(Aid aid*iprvtcred sqaid) tests the joint significance of Aid, aid*iprvtcred, and 
sqaid terms46. 
 
3.2 Data and Variables 
Fundamentally, the econometric approach for the present study is based on 
the previous literature investigating determinants of cross-country and time-series 
variation in inflation. For the specification of our model that allows investigation 
of our hypothesis, we most follow Neyaptı (2003) closely but not replicate. 
Neyaptı (2003) develops a model of inflation as a function of its first lag, budget 
deficits, the rate of growth of base money, and the rate of growth of real GDP, all 
lagged two periods, in addition to various measures of both CBI and FMD.  
                                                 
46
 The decision rule used for each of the tests is rejecting the null hypothesis, Ho if p-value < α 
significance level. 
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From Neyaptı (2003) we observe the variables of interest. However, we do 
not initially considered lags in this relationship. As a robustness check later on, we 
explore the lagged effects of these variables. Initially, we try to model inflation as 
a function of its lag, aid in percentages of gross income (GNI), the rate of growth 
of reserve money and real GDP, and a variable which reflects aid and FMD 
interaction. Our contribution is the discussion of aid and aid’s interaction with 
FMD. At early stages of modeling, budget deficit is pondered to be put in the 
model since it is accepted as a significant component to explain inflation in 
literature47. However, there exists a relationship between aid and budget deficit 
since foreign aid can be used for financing budget deficits. Therefore aid’s effect 
can be captured through budget deficit’s positive effect on inflation. Since, in our 
model, the primary cause of inflation is thought to be aid, and not the deficit itself, 
we focus on aid rather than budget deficit. 
Hence, our basic economic data set consists of GDP deflator, aid in 
percentages of GNI, the rate of growth of base money (currency plus bank 
reserves at the central bank); and the rate of growth of real GDP.  
 In addition, we consider the outliers in foreign aid and inflation series by 
including dummies. Furthermore, we allow for nonlinearities by including the 
product variable generated by the squared aid. For further steps in modelling, we 
also consider the volatility of growth of real GDP.  
This study analyzes the dynamic relationship between dependent and 
independent variables with the help of a panel data set. The data set consists of 60 
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 In Neyaptı (2003) budget deficit is found to be inflationary. See Sargent and Wallace (1981) and 
Catao and Terrones (2003) for further discussions about fiscal deficits and the dynamic 
relationship between inflation and deficit, respectively. 
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countries over the 1975 to 2004 period. Each country’s time series covers 
different number of observations, that is, the panel data is unbalanced. Full data 
set is drawn from three main sources: World Bank - World Development 
Indicators Online (WDI Online), The World Bank Financial Structure Database, 
and IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM version 1.1.54. 
Appendix A provides a detailed explanation of the panel data set including data 
sources, variable names and abbreviations, and all of the derivations (showing all 
calculations and formulations).  
The main dependent variable is inflation in the model. Inflation is calculated 
as a percentage rate of increase in the GDP deflator (GDPdef). GDPdef series is 
compiled from World Bank national accounts data and Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) National Accounts data files. GDPdef  is 
measured by the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local 
currency in which the base year varies by country. However, to omit the 
possibility of biases resulting from large variance in inflation series, it is decided 
to use a transformed form of inflation which is denoted by D 48 and corresponds to 
the real rate of depreciation in money stock. D is the perfect substitute of the 
inflation rate49. In addition, in order to control the effects of past D on current D, 
the first lag of D (D(-1)) is inserted in the model as an explanatory variable. In the 
data set lowest D value is the St. Vincent & Grens. (1975), while the maximum is 
reached at Nicaragua (1988)50.  
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 See Appendix A.2 for derivation:
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+
=D  where pi  denotes the inflation rate. 
49
 Cukierman et al. (1992) and  Neyaptı (2003) prefer to use this variable rather than the inflation 
rate for the same reasoning. 
50
 See Appendix C Table of descriptive statistics for details. 
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Foreign aid (Aid) is measured as a share of GNI which includes both official 
development assistance (ODA) and official aid. Ratios are computed using values 
in U.S. dollars converted at official exchange rate. The source of this series is 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, and World Bank and OECD GNI estimates51. In 
our data set, the highest amount of foreign aid recipient is Rwanda (1994), while 
the lowest is Malaysia (1996).  
Economic growth is measured as the rate of growth of real GDP (gGDP). 
gGDP series is compiled from World Bank national accounts data and OECD 
National Accounts data files. GDP growth rate is measured by annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources (WDI Online). 
Reserve money (resvM) is compiled from IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM in national currency.  
As mentioned before we search for the interaction of foreign aid and 
financial market development. There are several indicators of FMD suggested in 
the literature52. Financial deepening and the share of banking sector credit to the 
private sector in the total banking sector credit are among most commonly used 
measures of FMD in the literature. Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp 
(2000), Neyaptı (2003), and Nkusu and Sayek (2004) are all used at least one of 
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 Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, World Bank. 
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 See, King and Levine (1992 and 1993) ,and Ghani (1992). 
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these measures during their studies. Although neither of these indicated measures 
are the ideal measure for FMD (Neyaptı, 2003), to make sure our results are 
robust to the choice of FMD measures, we use a selection of FMD measures.  
FMD is measured as follows, in line with literature. Four variables are 
included in our study. First, we introduce liquid liabilities to GDP (Liqliab) which 
is calculated by broad money (money and quasi money) as a share of GDP, i.e. 
M2 in ratio to GDP. This measure includes the central bank, deposit money banks, 
and other financial institutions, which makes it a measure of overall size of the 
financial sector without distinguishing between different financial sectors and 
institutions. Second, we use private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
(Prvtcred), measured as the credit extended to the private sector by deposit money 
banks divided by GDP. Third, we use private credit by deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions to GDP (Prvtcrednofi), measured as the value of 
private credits extended by all financial intermediaries over GDP. Finally, the 
share of private sector credit in the total domestic credit in 
the financial system (Shareprvt) is used as an alternative measure of FMD. It is 
measured by dividing domestic credit to private sector (Domcredtoprvt) to 
domestic credit provided by banking sector (Domcred). While first measure 
captures the size, the last three measures all capture how much of financial 
intermediation is to the private sector, in other words is efficient. 
While both Domcredtoprvt and Domcred are compiled from World 
Development Indicators Online, the other indicated measures of FMD are all 
compiled from The World Bank Financial Structure Database. To obtain variables 
that are easy to interpret before using them in interaction with aid, they are 
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normalized by dividing them to the maximum value in each series53. Thus, the 
normalized variables of liqliab, Prvtcred, Prvtcrednofi, and Shareprvt (denoted as 
iliqliab, iprvtcred, iprvtcrednofi, and ishareprvt, respectively) have a scale 
ranging between zero and one. 
Openness to trade, another determinant of inflation in the literature, is 
measured by trade as a share of GDP (trade). It is equal to the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP and compiled from 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files 
(WDI Online). 
 
3.3. Hypotheses  
During this section specification of the empirical inflation model and the 
motives while shaping the model are going to be presented depending on the 
previously introduced information about the variables.  
In order to explain inflation, this study incorporates some variables parallel 
to the inflation and foreign aid literature. Especially, the foreign aid is the most 
discriminating explanatory variable among others, since to the best of our 
knowledge, the literature presents no example of an empirical study in which 
inflation is explained directly by aid. Even though, among others, Roemer (1989) 
and Younger (1992) mention about aid’s impact on inflation, they do not report a 
significant relationship or an empirical study. We hypothesize aid inflows have 
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inflationary effects, however, when the financial markets are developed enough 
this effect lessens.  
To capture the impact of past inflation on current inflation and consider the 
persistency of inflation, lagged values of the dependent variable are included in 
models. Both Liu and Olumuyiwa (2000) and Neyaptı (2003) (among others) 
propose lagged values of inflation and find a positive and significant relationship 
between past and current values of inflation. After adding D(-1) to the set of 
explanatory variables, this study also hypothesizes that there is positive causality 
from previous to present inflation, that is, high inflation in the past foretells higher 
inflation at the present. 
Like D(-1), GDP growth is also acknowledged to be a commonly used 
determinant of inflation in the literature. It captures the generally approved 
traditional Phillips curve behavior which supports the negative relation of 
unemployment and inflation. Since gGDP measures the economic growth rate, it 
changes as the amount of principal resources of capital and labor in the economy 
changes. Moreover, as unemployment of factors of production increases, 
production decreases. Hence, there exists a positive relationship between inflation 
and gGDP since unemployment and gGDP negatively related. As a result, we 
expect a significant positive coefficient of GDP growth in the model.  
 The growth of reserve money variable (gresvM) works here to include 
expansionary monetary effects. It captures the inflationary effect of an excess 
supply of money. In order to maintain the equilibrium point of supply and demand 
for money, monetary models support an increase in prices when the amount of 
money in the economy becomes greater than the amount of the public’s desire to 
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hold. That is, an excess supply of money can be followed by an upward pressure 
on inflation like an excess demand for goods does. As a result, as the growth of 
reserve money increases we expect inflation to increase54.  
As reviewed in the previous chapter, literature on foreign aid presents 
different scenarios of aid effects, such as altering the level and variability of both 
interest rates55 and real exchange rate, since it increases domestic liquidity and 
foreign exchange availability, as well. Some studies, like Burnside and Dollar 
(2000), Hansen and Tarp (2000), Neyaptı (2003), and Nkusu and Sayek (2004), 
linked the magnitude of all these changes to the recipient economy’s capacity to 
absorb or manage inflows of aid. Especially, sterilization was referred as an action 
to manage aid, or namely to decrease inflationary pressure (Buffie et al., 2004)56. 
The management is reported to be successfully performed in developed financial 
sector, especially in deep financial markets, since developed financial markets 
facilitate efficient allocation of financial resources and ease the monetary 
authorities’ control on monetary and exchange rate management (Nkusu and 
Sayek, 2004). Moreover, Maliszewski (2003) experienced for Georgia that 
“further accumulation of foreign reserves and development of indirect monetary 
control instruments, which would be facilitated by deeper treasury bill market, 
would increase the capacity of the central bank to respond to shocks”. That is, the 
state of financial system, namely financial depth, is accepted to be the main 
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 McCandless and Weber (1995) empirically supports a very close correlation between the rate of 
growth of monetary aggregates and inflation. See Lucas (1996) for details.  
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 In Nkusu and Sayek (2004), it is stated that the sterilization through treasury bills in a shallow 
domestic money market increases both level and volatility of domestic interest rate.  
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 For instance, if it is possible, decreasing the amount of incoming aid flow to that country may be 
another way of preventing from inflationary presures. 
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indicator of this capacity in the literature. As it is widely used in the literature, it is 
going to be measured by M2 as a share of GDP57. 
The high share of private sector credit in the total banking sector, by the 
way, indicates that banks are working effectively since it also indicates that banks 
are able to give more credit to private sector rather than public sector, i.e. less 
loans to state sector. This means private sector is managed to be involved in the 
economy more and financial and state sectors become more independent (Neyaptı, 
2003). Hence, while capturing the efficiency level of the market mechanism, this 
variable reflects of the development level of financial markets, as well. 
We hypothesize that developed financial markets improves the overall effect 
of aid on inflation. After identifying the characteristics of FMD measures, it can 
be concluded that higher values of each measure means higher development level 
for financial markets. Since it is hypothesized that good financial environment 
affects the performance of foreign aid, aid term interacted with a measure of 
financial development variable. 
The previous literature on growth and aid relation has supportive examples 
of improved aid effectiveness on countries with deeper financial markets58. These 
studies also make us eager to test the significance of aid and financial depth 
interaction. 
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 After introducing the list and the description of the control variables, the 
general form of the relationship follows as:  
D  = f ( lagged D, Aid, other control variables)           (3.3.1) 
As a starting point, we merely look at the direct effect of aid on inflation 
without considering the effect of FMD. This can be specified as: 
D = f (lagged D, Aid, gresvM, gGDP)                                    (3.3.2) 
With the help of equation (3.3.2) we try to search for the mere relation 
between aid and inflation. 
After checking for causality between aid and inflation, we start to look for 
the effect of FMD, and hence our model becomes: 
D = f (lagged D, Aid, gresvM, gGDP, Aid*FMD)                  (3.3.3) 
where Aid*FMD denotes interaction between aid and financial markets. Aid is 
also included as explanatory variables in the analysis as our vital explanatory 
variable. We use separately the FMD indicators on different runs to check for the 
robustness of the findings. 
 For robustness check, we create dummies for inflation (di) and aid series 
(da) in order to deal with hyperinflation cases and omit outliers in foreign aid 
series, respectively59. The dummy for inflation, di, is equal to one when inflation 
is greater than 100 %, otherwise zero. As stated in Bahmani-Oskooee and Domaç 
(2003), the relationship among inflation and economic fundamentals could differ 
across countries with different inflation levels. Thus, creating a dummy variable 
for high inflationary countries may help capture this feature. The dummy for aid, 
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variables created. 
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da, helps omitting an aid variable which takes a value greater than 40 % of GNI60. 
In the following steps, we create a dummy for focusing on countries with positive 
growth in addition to the previously indicated dummies since it is suspected that 
when growth is negative, due to a negative supply shock, a positive relationship 
between GDP growth and inflation may be violated. This dummy of growth, dg, is 
equal to zero when GDP growth is less than 0, otherwise one.  
Moreover, we create square of aid, sqaid, variable to take into account the 
nonlinearity of the series. The models with Aid and sqaid help define whether 
Laffer curve behavior exist for our data set or not. Aid Laffer curve supports that 
the benefits from aid increase at initial stages, and decreases after a certain level. 
Hadjimichael, et al. (1995), Durbarry et al. (1998), Lensink and White (1999) all 
include aid squared as a regressor in growth model and find positive, but 
decreasing marginal returns of aid flows in growth models, that is, significantly 
positive coefficient of aid term with significantly negative coefficient of aid 
squared term. Although we are dealing with aid inflation specification, rather than 
aid growth specification, these studies motivate our introducing of squared aid 
term and foster our curiosity about the effect of this term in our model. It is 
decided to examine that whether same pattern as in previous studies on growth is 
able to be established for inflation or not. If aid has a nonlinear effect on the real 
side of the economy, as shown in these previous studies, then investigating if such 
nonlinear effects are evident on the nominal side is already worth to examine. 
In the following, we consider volatility of GDP growth as an additional 
regressor. Our data set consists of aid recipient countries, which are mostly 
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developing countries. Therefore, we suspect about variability of economic growth 
in these countries. Given that such economies could be ridden by volatile GDP 
patterns, we are interested in whether or not this characteristic of economies has 
any significant impact on inflation. In order to capture this variability we add 
volatility of GDP growth calculated with the values of series in three respective 
years, i.e. for the observation at time t, it is the standard deviation of observations 
at times t-1, t, and t+161. 
Furthermore, we analyze the effect of openness to trade as an additional 
explanatory variable in our model. IMF (2001) reports that although the effect of 
openness to trade on inflation seems to change from sample to another, greater 
openness to trade is mainly associated with lower inflation62. In order to examine 
whether our sample of aid recipient countries also supports this generalized result 
or not, we add a measure of openness to trade in our model. In IMF (2001), it is 
additionally reported that the effect of openness on inflation may, over the long 
term, occur largely through fiscal policy and financial developments that affect the 
size of inflation tax base. Since our model already accounts for FMD, the effect of 
openness on inflation can be captured more accurately. The variable trade is a 
measure of openness to trade; openness to trade increases as it gets larger. 
Above all, we insert all these variables into our model so as to capture the 
dynamics of inflation and, hence, to obtain a more reliable or a more accurate 
model for inflation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 This chapter essentially presents the econometric models tracing the 
objective of the analysis and subsequently the results obtained with the help of 
these models. We first introduce the model specifications, and follow up with a 
discussion of the regression results. In addition, this chapter provides support for 
detailed specification of models introduced in section 3.3. The models are all 
based on the general form of the model (3.3.1). In section 4.1, we do regression 
runs to determine the behavior and significancy of the explanatory variables. In 
section 4.2, we shape our model depending on the results obtained in previous 
section and depending on the model of Neyaptı (2003). Especially, we focus on 
the models including the first lags of some explanatory variables in section 4.2. 
 
4.1 Determining the General Form 
Initially, we merely look at the direct effect of aid on inflation without 
considering the effect of FMD as introduced in model (3.3.2) and estimate the 
following equation by GMM: 
itititittiiit gresvMgGDPAidDD εβββββ +++++= − 4321,10             (4.1.1) 
where i0β  denotes the country specific fixed effects. 
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Since we are investigating whether foreign aid has an inflationary impact on 
recipient economy or not, the main hypothesis is that there exists a positive and 
significant relation between foreign aid (Aid) and the real rate of depreciation in 
money stock (D). We also investigate the effect of other basic variables like the 
first lag of the real rate of depreciation in money stock (D(-1)), growth of GDP 
(gGDP) and growth of reserve money (gresvM).  
For this and all succeeding regressions, the dynamic panel data estimation 
technique described in section 3.1 is used and estimation is carried out with the 
help of software program Ox 3.10. The set of instrumental variables consists of 
the level of all explanatory variables except D(-1) and instruments of GMM-type, 
i.e. second and further lags of D. 
The regression results of model (4.1.1) are reported in column I of Table 
4.1.1 in the next page. 
Wald (joint) statistic in column I helps us to reject the null hypothesis of the 
Wald test which means at least one of the coefficients are statistically significant. 
Sargan test statistics tells us that instruments are found to be valid. Finally, 
according to the AR(2) test statistics it can be concluded that there is no second 
order correlation. The coefficients are all significant, Aid with 5% significance 
and others with 1% significance. D is strongly persistent since the coefficient of 
D(-1) is significantly positive. The expectations about the signs of coefficients of 
all explanatory variables but gGDP are satisfied. It is found that, contrary to a 
priori expectations, gGDP has a statistically significant but negative effect on 
current real rate of depreciation. However, our hypothesis of positive causality 
from foreign aid to inflation is supported.  
 63 
Table 4. 1. 1: Regression results for the models (4.1.1) and (4.1.2) 
Dependent Variable: D 
Explanatory 
Variables:  Columns: 
 
I II 
 D(-1)
 
39.93*** 
(23.40) 
38.40*** 
(19.00) 
 Aid 0.05** (2.05) 
0.16* 
(1.92) 
sqaid ... -0.02 (-1.43) 
gresvM 0.01*** (35.40) 
0.01*** 
(36.00) 
gGDP -0.33*** (-12.60) 
-0.34*** 
(-13.30) 
Constant -0.25*** (-9.24) 
-0.22*** 
(-7.80) 
No. of observation 1386 1386 
Wald (joint) 2964 [0.000] 2296 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 85.38 [0.000] 60.89 [0.000] 
Sargan test 48.84 [1.000] 
44.55 
[1.000] 
AR(2) test 1.11 [0.269] 1.05 [0.292] 
Note: The coefficient of sqaid in 2nd column is multiplied with 1000 while all other coefficients are 
multiplied with 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-probabilities; numbers in brackets are the p-
values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates 
significance at 10% level. See Appendix F.1 and F.2 for the detailed Wald test results of joint 
significance between explanatory variables of the given models in Table 4.1.1.  
 
In column II of Table 4.1.1, square of aid (sqaid) component is added to 
search for nonlinearity in aid series and Laffer curve behavior of Aid. The model 
4.1.1 transforms into: 
ititititittiiit sqaidgresvMgGDPAidDD εββββββ ++++++= − 54321,10      (4.1.2) 
It can be concluded that sqaid variable is not significant, i.e. there is no 
nonlinearity in the effect of aid on inflation. In addition, Aid is still significant and 
positive, which still supports our main hypothesis. The significant negative sign in 
the coefficient of gGDP further remains while the other variables’ coefficients 
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have the expected signs. According to Wald (joint) test statistics in column II, at 
least one of the coefficients is significantly different than zero. In addition, with 
the help of the Sargan statistics, it can be concluded that the instruments are 
appropriate. Furthermore, AR(2) test results supports the nonexistence of the 
second order serial correlation among error term. 
After finding a significant relationship between D and Aid, we go on our 
investigation with the effect of FMD. In order to examine the role of FMD in 
explaining the relationship between D and Aid, the interaction between aid and 
financial markets development is used as an additional explanatory variable to the  
model (4.1.1). Thus, we run the regression below: 
ititititittiiit FMDAidgresvMgGDPAidDD εββββββ ++++++= − )*(54321,10  
 (4.1.3) 
Following related literature review in previous chapters, we hypothesize that 
as the level of financial markets’ development increases, the capacity of absorbing 
or managing inflationary effects of aid increases. Thus, we expect negative 
relationship between foreign aid-FMD interaction and inflation.  
In Table 4.1.2, each column represents the regression result with different 
measure of FMD; while first column presents the measure of the financial 
market’s size, the other columns present the measure of the share of private sector 
credit in different aggregate values.  
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Table 4. 1. 2: Regression results for the model specification (4.1.3) 
Dependent Variable: D 
Explanatory 
Variables: FMD = iliqliab iprvtcred iprvtcrednofi ishareprvt IshareprvtL 
 D(-1)
 
38.11*** 
(15.10) 
36.64*** 
(15.00) 
39.22*** 
(20.40) 
38.27*** 
(20.90) 
38.27*** 
(21.40) 
 Aid 0.25*** (6.00) 
0.33*** 
(5.52) 
0.24*** 
(4.72) 
0.07*** 
(2.64) 
0.06** 
(2.29) 
gresvM 0.01*** (46.20) 
0.01*** 
(38.50) 
0.01*** 
(32.10) 
0.01*** 
(33.70) 
0.01*** 
(33.20) 
gGDP -0.43*** (-15.90) 
-0.44*** 
(-17.50) 
-0.43*** 
(-15.80) 
-0.34*** 
(-12.20) 
-0.34*** 
(-11.00) 
Aid*FMD -0.67*** (-4.55) 
-1.18*** 
(-4.12) 
-1.01*** 
(-4.05) 
-5.19** 
(-2.35) 
-0.20*** 
(-3.17) 
Constant -0.28*** (-7.28) 
-0.30*** 
(-7.83) 
-0.29*** 
(-7.02) 
-0.26*** 
(-8.22) 
-0.25*** 
(-7.70) 
No. of observation 1218 1208 1214 1366 1346 
Wald (joint) 3968 [0.000] 4107 [0.000] 4433 [0.000] 2662 [0.000] 2656 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 53.03 [0.000] 61.37 [0.000] 49.29 [0.000] 67.59 [0.000] 59.26 [0.000] 
Sargan test 45.96 [1.000] 
44.58 
[1.000] 
48.52 
[1.000] 
47.55 
[1.000] 
46.68 
[1.000] 
AR(2) test 0.71 [0.481] 0.66 [0.511] 0.72 [0.470] 1.08 [0.282] 1.08 [0.279] 
Note: All of the coefficients are multiplied with 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-
probabilities; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level. In column I, iliqliab 
calculated by Liqliab, the series of liquid liabilities to GDP. In column II, iprvtcred calculated by 
Prvtcred, the series of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. In column III, iprvtcrednofi 
calculated by Prvtcrednofi, the series of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP. In column IV, ishareprvt calculated with the help of Domcredtoprvt and 
Domcred. In column V, ishareprvtL is the series of ishareprvt without Lesotho, i.e. for country 
Lesotho all inputs are “na”, not available. See Appendix A.1 and A.2 for variable details. 
 
As shown in Table 4.1.2, all explanatory variables in columns I, II, and III 
are significant with %1 percent confidence and have expected signs, except 
gGDP. Aid is still significantly positive. Moreover, Wald test, Sargan test and 
AR(2) test results support our model. Furthermore, the interaction term Aid*FMD 
is found to be negatively significant across three measures of FMD represented in 
columns I to III, as hypothesized. Hence, the results in columns I, II, and III 
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supports our expectations about the effect of FMD on inflation associated with 
foreign aid inflows. 
In column IV, it can be seen that index of the share of banking sector credit 
to the private sector in the total banking sector credit (ishareprvt) is significant, 
and its coefficient is much smaller than the previous measures. When Shareprvt 
series is examined in detail, it is observed that there exists a significant outlier 
value (Lesotho-1977). As reported in Table 4.1.3, when we omit the outlying 
country Lesotho (the new series is called ishareprvtL) we obtain a more 
homogenous63, and thus, a more reliable data set. The regression results in column 
V are the recalculated results after omitting the outlier country and it is accepted 
that these results are valid since ishareprvtL is observed to be a more reliable 
measure of the share of banking sector credit to the private sector in the total 
banking sector credit.  
Table 4. 1. 3: Table of descriptive statistics for ishareprvt and ishareprvtL 
 Shareprvt ShareprvtL (w/o Lesotho) 
Mean 2.056 0.70 
Standard Error 1.35 0.08 
Standard Deviation 55.53 3.18 
Sample Variance 3083.66 10.13 
Kurtosis 1669.76 418.63 
Skewness 40.78 12.10 
Range 2321.58 133.44 
Minimum 
-47.25 
(Trinidad and Tobago 1975) 
-47.25 
(Trinidad and Tobago 1975) 
Maximum 
2274.33 
(Lesotho 1977) 
86.19 
(Mauritania 1999) 
Largest(2) 86.19 (Mauritania 1999) 58.03 (Mauritania 2001) 
Smallest(2) -42.51 (Lesotho 1999) -31.56 (Bhutan 1991) 
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 Especially, it can be seen that standard deviation and sample variance are decreased significantly 
when we omit Lesotho. 
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It can be concluded for measures in columns I, II, III, and V that in an 
economy, a larger size of the financial market increases the capacity of financial 
absorption, making possible for policymakers to manage aid flows in a manner 
that fosters aid effectiveness while decreasing the inflationary effects.  
After observing the significance of four measures of FMD in columns I, II, 
III, and V we decided to use private credit by deposit money banks to GDP index 
(iprvtcred) as a measure of FMD for the succeeding regression analysis since 
there seem to be no significant difference in the results of these columns. 
Although it is not tabled, in order to check the robustness of FMD measures once 
more, some of the succeeding regressions are run by other three measures and it is 
observed that the results do not change quantitatively. 
 In looking into the aid data, we observe outliers64. In order to prevent 
possible bias as caused by these outliers, we create a dataset that excludes the 
outliers in Aid series with the help of the dummy variable “da”. Thus, the da*Aid 
series is purified of outliers. Here, the first model we are interested is given below: 
ititititittiiit iprvtcredaidgresvMgGDPaidDD εβββββ ++++++= − )*(4321,10     
                      (4.1.4) 
where aid is a variable which can be substituted by Aid or da*Aid variables. 
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Table 4.1.4 serves the results of the model (4.1.4).  
Table 4. 1. 4: Regression results of models considering the outliers in Aid 
Dependent Variable: D 
Explanatory 
Variables: aid = Aid da*Aid 
D(-1)
 
36.64*** 
(15.00) 
38.82*** 
(23.10) 
aid 0.33*** (5.52) 
0.10* 
(1.66) 
gGDP -0.44*** (-17.50) 
-0.43*** 
(-18.40) 
gresvM 0.01*** (38.50) 
0.01*** 
(40.50) 
aid*iprvtcred -1.18*** (-4.12) 
-0.65*** 
(-3.41) 
Constant -0.30*** (-7.83) 
-0.31*** 
(-8.39) 
No. of observation 1208 1202 
Wald (joint) 4107 [0.000] 3192 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 61.37 [0.000] 70.38 [0.000] 
Sargan test 44.58 [1.000] 
50.07 
[1.000] 
AR(2) test 0.66 [0.511] 0.44 [0.659] 
Wald (aid, aid*iprvtcred) 31.54 [0.000] 11.74 [0.003] 
Note: All of the coefficients are multiplied with 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-
probabilities; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level. In Wald (Aid, 
aid*iprvtcred) row the test statistics of joint significance is given. Dummy of Aid (da) is calculated 
by: 
otherwiseif
Aidifna
da
1
40"" >
=
. Because of not available observations in FMD series for Mauritania 
1976 and 1978, Sierra Leone 2001 and 2002, Guyana 1990 and 1991, Rwanda 1994 and 1995, we 
actually omit 6 outliers in Aid series. See Appendix E for the whole set of outliers in Aid series. 
 
In the first column, Aid series is originally used but in the second column the 
outliers in Aid series are omitted with introducing da*Aid, rather than Aid. That is, 
the variable named aid in the set of explanatory variables is Aid series in the first 
column, and da*Aid series in the second column. Test results support the model 
and all coefficients are significant. After comparing the results in two columns, it 
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can be concluded that omitting the outliers in Aid series does not cause a 
significant change in test results as well as magnitudes of coefficients. The change 
in rejection probabilities of aid variable seems to be the only striking difference 
between the two column. But in both columns, aid variable is significant and has 
positive sign. With the help of Table 4.1.4 it can be concluded that outliers in Aid 
series do not have a significant effect on the analysis and, as a result, for the 
following series Aid series is going to be used. In addition, it can be concluded 
with the help of Wald (aid, aid*iprvtcred) row in Table 4.1.4 that both Aid and 
da*Aid is jointly significant with aid*iprvtcred. We suspected that aid and 
aid*iprvtcred series can show similar pattern since aid*iprvtcred involves aid 
series’ dynamics. We did these Wald tests in order to check our suspect about 
these series. 
After controlling the effects of outliers, it is decided to go on with checking 
the significancy of nonlinearity in Aid in a model considering FMD, which is 
presented in columns I and III of Table 4.1.5, and volatility of gGDP, which is 
presented in columns II and III of Table 4.1.5 in the next page. 
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Table 4. 1. 5: Regression results of models considering nonlinearity of Aid 
(sqaid) and volatility in gGDP (vol3) 
Dependent Variable: D 
Explanatory 
Variables: Column: I II III 
 D(-1)
 
35.82*** 
(15.70) 
41.07*** 
(22.10) 
40.63*** 
(19.30) 
 Aid 0.02 (0.21) 
0.29*** 
(5.79) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
sqaid 0.01*** (5.08) ... 
0.01*** 
(4.68) 
gresvM 0.01*** (49.90) 
0.01*** 
(33.10) 
0.01*** 
(33.40) 
gGDP -0.44*** (-19.10) 
-0.44*** 
(-19.40) 
-0.43*** 
(-18.30) 
vol3 … 0.38*** (8.11) 
0.39*** 
(7.80) 
aid*iprvtcred  -1.09*** (-4.07) 
-1.16*** 
(-4.16) 
-1.06*** 
(-3.78) 
Constant -0.30*** (-7.73) 
-0.28*** 
(-10.60) 
-0.29*** 
(-8.31) 
No. of observation 1208 1208 1208 
Wald (joint) 5463 [0.000] 4203 [0.000] 4729 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 59.74 [0.000] 112.20 [0.000] 69.05 [0.000] 
Sargan test 44.05 [1.000] 
50.60 
[1.000] 
50.70 
[1.000] 
AR(2) test 0.64 [0.520] 0.69 [0.492] 0.68 [0.496] 
Wald(Aid,sqaid,   
aid*iprvtcred) 
89.54 
[0.000] … 
46.10 
[0.000] 
Wald (Aid, aid*iprvtcred) 18.43 [0.000] 33.91 [0.000] 16.38 [0.000] 
 
Note: The coefficients all coefficients are multiplied with 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-
probabilities; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level. In Wald (Aid, sqaid, 
aid*iprvtcred) and Wald (Aid, aid*iprvtcred) rows the test statistics of joint significance of the 
variables in parentheses is given. 
 
The test results of Sargan, Wald and AR(2) tests all support the models in 
each column of  Table 4.1.5. We can see the inflation’s persistency in each 
column with the help of the significant positive large coefficient of D(-1). In Table 
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4.1.5, the negative sign of gGDP coefficient is still contradicting to our a priori 
expectations, but all other coefficients still have expected signs.  
Remember that, we have found an insignificant sqaid in model (4.1.2). In 
order to control nonlinearity further, we add sqaid variable in a model considering 
FMD. In columns I and III, Aid is not significant, however, sqaid is significant. 
Given the significance of the quadratic term sqaid in a model with an insignificant 
Aid variable, it is decided to test the joint significance of Aid and aid*iprvtcred, 
and Aid, sqaid, and aid*iprvtcred. In Wald (Aid, aid*iprvtcred) and Wald (Aid, 
sqaid, aid*iprvtcred) rows of columns I and III, it can be seen that they are jointly 
significant. Then, we can conclude that inflationary effects of aid increases as the 
aid level increases beyond a certain threshold. This result is supported by 
positively significant sqaid coefficients in columns I and III. 
It is also decided to consider the volatility of GDP growth in the analysis. As 
mentioned before, since our data set consists of aid recipient countries, significant 
variability in growth series of these countries is expected due to the inherent 
macroeconomic instability experienced by these countries. In order to capture this 
variability we add a volatility component, named vol3, calculated with standard 
deviation of three respective values in the time-series of gGDP. The results in 
columns II and III of Table 4.1.5 for different models support the significant 
volatility in gGDP.  
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In Table 4.1.6 below, it is investigated whether using vol5, rather than vol3, 
affects the regression results or not.  
Table 4. 1. 6: Regression results of models considering different measures for 
volatility in gGDP  (vol3 and vol5) 
Dependent Variable: D 
Explanatory 
Variables: Column: I II III IV 
 D(-1)
 
41.07*** 
(22.10) 
40.63*** 
(19.30) 
37.83*** 
(15.00) 
37.24*** 
(16.60) 
 Aid 0.29*** (5.79) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
0.30*** 
(4.74) 
-0.04 
(-0.45) 
sqaid ... 0.01*** (4.68) … 
0.01*** 
(5.35) 
gresvM 0.01*** (33.10) 
0.01*** 
(33.40) 
0.01*** 
(33.60) 
0.01*** 
(45.30) 
gGDP -0.44*** (-19.40) 
-0.43*** 
(-18.30) 
-0.44*** 
(-17.50) 
-0.43*** 
(-18.60) 
vol3 0.38*** (8.11) 
0.39*** 
(7.80) … ... 
vol5 … … 0.22*** (4.77) 
0.22*** 
(4.92) 
aid*iprvtcred  -1.16*** (-4.16) 
-1.06*** 
(-3.78) 
-1.12*** 
(-4.10) 
-1.00*** 
(-3.87) 
Constant -0.28*** (-10.60) 
-0.29*** 
(-8.31) 
-0.25*** 
(-6.41) 
-0.26*** 
(-6.22) 
No. of observation 1208 1208 1208 1208 
Wald (joint) 4203 [0.000] 4729 [0.000] 3850 [0.000] 5260 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 112.20 [0.000] 69.05 [0.000] 41.05 [0.000] 38.72 [0.000] 
Sargan test 50.60 [1.000] 
50.70 
[1.000] 
43.44 
[1.000] 
43.02 
[1.000] 
AR(2) test 0.69 [0.492] 0.68 [0.496] 0.68 [0.496] 0.67 [0.501] 
Note: The coefficients all coefficients are multiplied with 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-
probabilities; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
Here, vol5 represents the volatility of GDP growth calculated with the values 
of series in five respective years, i.e. for the observation at time t, it is the standard 
deviation of observations at times t-2, t-1, t, t+1, and t+2.  
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It is observed that the difference in measures of volatility does not cause any 
significant change in regression results. As a result, it is decided to go on our 
analysis considering volatility with the help of vol3 variable. 
In Table 4.1.7 we introduced di*gGDP (in columns I and II) and trade (in 
columns III and IV) in order to examine the effects of macroeconomic instability 
and openness to trade on inflation, respectively.  
Table 4. 1. 7: Regression results after introducing di*gGDP and trade 
Dependent Variable: D 
Explanatory 
Variables: Columns: I II III IV 
 D(-1)
 
36.79*** 
(15.20) 
40.90*** 
(21.20) 
42.01*** 
(18.6) 
41.62*** 
(18.90) 
 Aid 0.31*** (5.38) 
0.29*** 
(5.84) 
0.22*** 
(4.12) 
0.27*** 
(5.76) 
gresvM 0.01*** (33.70) 
0.01*** 
(28.90) 
0.01*** 
(34.00) 
0.01*** 
(36.40) 
gGDP -0.43*** (-16.60) 
-0.43*** 
(-17.30) 
-0.44*** 
(-17.40) 
-0.44*** 
(-17.90) 
di*gGDP -0.43*** (-3.77) 
-0.40*** 
(-3.69) … … 
vol3 … 0.39*** (8.15) 
0.06 
(1.01) … 
trade … … 0.09*** (3.87) 
0.10*** 
(3.94) 
aid*iprvtcred -1.11*** (-4.03) 
-1.15*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.98*** 
(-4.75) 
-1.05*** 
(-5.47) 
Constant -0.31*** (-7.93) 
-0.30*** 
(-11.00) 
-0.29*** 
(-6.20) 
-0.32*** 
(-7.01) 
No. of observation 1208 1208 1207 1207 
Wald (joint) 3699 [0.000] 3673 [0.000] 4163 [0.000] 4048 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 62.94 [0.000] 120.20 [0.000] 38.43 [0.000] 49.08 [0.000] 
Sargan test 44.38 [1.000] 
50.61 
[1.000] 
46.09 
[1.000] 
48.94 
[1.000] 
AR(2) test 0.62 [0.535] 0.65 [0.517] 0.72 [0.474] 0.70 [0.486] 
Note:  All of the coefficients are multiplied with 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-
probabilities; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level. Dummy of inflation 
(di) is: 
otherwiseif
if
di
0
1001 >
=
pi
 .  
 
 74 
Price pressures in hyperinflation economies are expected to dominantly be 
coming from the demand side since a positive supply side generally occurs in 
economies with good, or namely stable, macroeconomic conditions. As a result, it 
is decided to introduce a dummy variable, di, to examine the behavior of 
hyperinflation countries in detail where di is equal to one for hyperinflation 
countries and zero otherwise. We expect di*gGDP variable to have a positive 
sign. However, as we can see in Table 4.1.7, this is not the case; the coefficient of 
di*gGDP is significantly negative for each scenarios in columns I and II.  
The effect of openness to trade on inflation also examined. In IMF (2001), it 
is reported that the effect of openness to trade on inflation seems to change from 
sample to another, however, it is also concluded that greater openness to trade is 
mainly associated with lower inflation. Thus, we were expecting a negative 
coefficient for our trade variable, given that it is significant. However, the 
regression results for models represented columns III and IV of Table 4.1.7 
support the reverse. That is, as openness to trade increases, inflation rises. 
However, this result is again consistent with IMF (2001) report. Because it is 
reported that there may exist changes from sample to sample, only “in general” 
the expected result is obtained65. 
So far, we have included several nonlinear terms. To further ensure 
robustness regarding the nonlinearity we also control for FMD measure. This is in 
line with Hansen and Tarp (2001) whose general growth model includes aid, aid 
squared, aid times policy index, and policy squared. Actually in our basic analysis 
                                                 
65
 In an effort to identify whether the trade effect is via the pass through of import prices to 
domestic prices we include imports of goods and services (% of GDP) as an alternative openness 
measure. However, it is observed that the imports variable is insignificant for different scenarios. 
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we exclude FMD as a separate regressor since it is a mostly time invariant 
variable. Therefore, what we do here is to solely for robustness checks. 
In order to check of the nonlinearity further, we examine the significancy of 
FMD square term, i.e. squared of iprvtcred, in Table 4.1.8 for different scenarios.  
Table 4. 1. 8: Regression results after introducing sqiprvtcred 
Dependent Variable: D 
Explanatory 
Variables: Columns: I II III IV 
D(-1)
 
38.13*** 
(17.30) 
41.38*** 
(17.00) 
42.30*** 
(25.30) 
42.53*** 
(25.80) 
Aid -0.07 (-0.76) 
-0.09 
(-0.98) 
-0.20* 
(-1.89) 
-0.20** 
(-2.09) 
sqaid 0.01*** (5.26) 
0.01*** 
(5.16) 
0.01*** 
(5.51) 
0.01*** 
(5.45) 
gresvM 0.01*** (38.40) 
0.01*** 
(33.00) 
0.01*** 
(37.10) 
0.01*** 
(36.10) 
gGDP -0.46*** (-17.60) 
-0.46*** 
(-17.50) 
-0.46*** 
(-18.10) 
-0.46*** 
(-17.60) 
vol3 … 0.39*** (7.26) … 
0.12* 
(1.65) 
trade … … 0.09*** (3.40) 
0.08*** 
(3.18) 
sqiprvtcred -22.17** (-2.15) 
-24.62** 
(-2.31) 
-16.81* 
(-1.68) 
-18.69* 
(-1.82) 
aid*iprvtcred -0.97*** (-3.54) 
-0.83*** 
(-2.9) 
-0.68*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.64*** 
(-2.61) 
Constant -0.26*** (-5.50) 
-0.21*** 
(-4.64) 
-0.25*** 
(-5.12) 
-0.23*** 
(-4.76) 
No. of observation 1208 1208 1207 1207 
Wald (joint) 4135 [0.000] 3903 [0.000] 4793 [0.000] 22.64 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 30.21 [0.000] 21.52 [0.000] 26.22 [0.000] 46.89 [1.000] 
Sargan test 49.96 [1.000] 
51.19 
[1.000] 
46.96 
[1.000] 
0.73 
[0.466] 
AR(2) test 0.69 [0.492] 0.70 [0.483] 0.72  [0.471] 48.15 [0.000] 
Wald (Aid, sqaid,       
aid*iprvtcred, sqprvtcred) 
61.77 
[0.000] 
53.20 
[0.000] 
56.44 
[0.000] 
19.84 
[0.000] 
Wald (Aid, aid*iprvtcred) 18.68 [0.000] 14.04 [0.001] 21.47 [0.000] 22.64 [0.000] 
Note:  All of the coefficients are multiplied with 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-
probabilities; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level. 
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In table 4.1.8, it can be seen that sqaid, sqiprvtcred, and aid*iprvtcred have 
all expected signs and are significant. Although Aid is insignificant in columns I 
and II, Wald test of Aid and aid*iprvtcred shows that they are jointly significant. 
Therefore, our hypothesis is supported, and found to be robust. 
Finally, it is decided to stress the effect of positive and negative growth. The 
regression results considering this discrimination is given in Table 4.1.9. 
Table 4. 1. 9: Regression results after introducing dg*gGDP 
Dependent Variable: D 
 
Explanatory 
Variables: Column: I II III IV 
 D(-1)
 
36.68*** 
(15.70) 
41.08*** 
(21.20) 
42.18*** 
(20.90) 
42.61*** 
(21.60) 
 Aid 0.31*** (5.55) 
0.29*** 
(5.05) 
0.27*** 
(6.21) 
0.22*** 
(4.09) 
gresvM 0.01*** (30.30) 
0.01*** 
(31.80) 
0.01*** 
(32.50) 
0.01*** 
(33.10) 
gGDP -0.68*** (-11.50) 
-0.54*** 
(-9.47) 
-0.69*** 
(-11.00) 
-0.61*** 
(-10.40) 
dg*gGDP 0.32*** (4.04) 
0.14* 
(1.66) 
0.34*** 
(4.16) 
0.23*** 
(3.00) 
vol3 … 0.38*** (6.80) … 
0.06 
(1.07) 
trade … … 0.09*** (3.92) 
0.09*** 
(3.70) 
aid*iprvtcred  -1.07*** (-3.51) 
-1.11*** 
(-3.65) 
-1.02*** 
(-5.02) 
-0.94*** 
(-4.43) 
Constant -0.28*** (-7.31) 
-0.28*** 
(-10.20) 
-0.30*** 
(-6.48) 
-0.27*** 
(-6.03) 
No. of observation 1208 1208 1207 1207 
Wald (joint) 2854 [0.000] 3207 [0.000] 2104 [0.000] 2291 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 53.41 [0.000] 103.60 [0.000] 41.95 [0.000] 36.32 [0.000] 
Sargan test 43.44 [1.000] 
50.61 
[1.000] 
48.32 
[1.000] 
46.64 
[1.000] 
AR(2) test 0.67 [0.502] 0.68 [0.495] 0.71 [0.477] 0.72 [0.469] 
Note:  All of the coefficients are multiplied with 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-
probabilities; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level. Dummy of gGDP is 
otherwiseif
gGDPif
dg
1
00 <
=
. 
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In countries with supply shocks, there exists negative growth, combined 
with an increase in the inflation rate. For instance, the recent Hurricane Katrina, 
while hitting the supply side of US economy, lessens the economy’s ability to 
produce goods and services. The rise in world oil prices over the last thirty years, 
on the other hand, can be proposed to be another example of supply shocks. The 
rise in oil prices may cause an increase in the variable costs of firms which use oil 
as an essential input during their production process. As a result, firms may raise 
the prices of their output to protect their gross profit and this cause a decrease in 
demand. Moreover, if the rise in oil prices affects sufficient industries across the 
economy, then the real output will fall. Hence, a supply shock such as this has an 
upward effect on inflation but a downward effect on real output66.  
As reviewed in previous chapters, literature on growth and inflation supports 
positive causality. In our data set, some portion of aid receiver countries has 
negative growth and some has positive. When growth is negative, due to a 
negative supply shock, we may not expect a positive sign for GDP growth in a 
model of inflation. Thus, we search for the expected positive relation of GDP 
growth and inflation in a subset of countries with positive GDP growth.  
As seen in Table 4.1.9, the coefficient of dg*gGDP is significantly positive 
for different model specifications in each column. As a result, we can conclude 
that we capture our expected positive sign of gGDP coefficient for countries with 
positive GDP growth.  
                                                 
66
 In order to equate supply and demand, the central bank may interfere to decrease aggregate 
demand by increasing interest rates after a negative supply shock. 
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4.2 Robustness Checks: Further Time Dynamics 
When we go back to the model of Neyaptı (2003), it is seen that Neyaptı 
(2003) includes lags of gGDP and gresvM, not the contemporary components of 
both. This necessitates that we ensure our results hold with Neyaptı (2003)’s lag 
structure67. Despite testing different lag structures for all explanatory variables, we 
hypothesize that aid has an immediate effect on the economy. When aid inflows to 
a country, we hypothesize that it has an immediate upward effect on inflation. 
That is, economically, we are not interested in the past values of aid, we are 
searching for the contemporary effect of aid on contemporary inflation, and we 
believed that the change in inflation can be observed in one year. As a result, we 
do not consider the lag of Aid, thus, aid*iprvtcred or sqaid as well.  
 Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 present the regression results of model 
specifications with lagged explanatory variables, except Aid, aid*iprvtcred, and 
sqaid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67
 Neyaptı (2003) finds appropriate lag length for explanatory variables to be two. In our case, two 
lagged components are always observed to be not significant for different scenarios. When the first 
lagged explanatory variables considered, it is observed that aid*iprvtcred(-1) and Aid(-1) become 
insignificant in each different model specification. However, gGDP(-1) and gresvM(-1) preserves 
their significancy with expected signs. 
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Table 4. 2. 1: Regression results with lagged variables 
Dependent Variable: D 
Explanatory 
Variables: Columns: I II III IV 
 D(-1)
 
40.33*** 
(24.40) 
39.98*** 
(23.70) 
39.11*** 
(21.80) 
38.73*** 
(21.20) 
 Aid 0.02 (0.43) 
0.03 
(0.65) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
gresvM(-1) 0.01*** (47.40) 0.01*** (41.70) 0.01*** (44.70) 0.01*** (39.70) 
gGDP(-1) 0.09** (2.03) 0.08* (1.92) 0.08* (1.85) 0.08* (1.81) 
vol3(-1) … 0.00 (-0.08) … 0.03 (0.61) 
trade(-1) … … 0.03* (1.73) 0.04* (1.74) 
aid*iprvtcred -0.69** (-2.39) 
-0.79** 
(-2.42) 
-0.67** 
(-2.22) 
-0.71** 
(-2.12) 
Constant -0.24*** (-9.21) 
-0.24*** 
(-9.13) 
-0.28*** 
(-10.70) 
-0.28*** 
(-10.40) 
No. of observation 1200 1200 1198 1198 
Wald (joint) 6770 [0.000] 6077 [0.000] 4845 [0.000] 4371 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 84.88 [0.000] 83.29 [0.000] 115.00 [0.000] 107.80 [0.000] 
Sargan test 52.51 [1.000] 
52.14 
[1.000] 
52.40 
[1.000] 
52.23 
[1.000] 
AR(2) test 0.14 [0.889] 0.14 [0.887] 0.09 [0.926] 0.086 [0.932] 
Wald (Aid, aid*iprvtcred) 7.41 [0.025] 7.69 [0.021] 7.61 [0.022] 7.95 [0.019] 
Note:  All of the coefficients are multiplied with 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-
probabilities; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
In Table 4.2.1, it can be seen that although Aid is insignificant, the joint 
significance Wald test of Aid and aid*iprvtcred shows that they are jointly 
significant with %5 confidence. As a result, we accept that these specifications 
including lags of control variables (except variables including aid series) again 
support our hypothesis that, when financial markets developed enough, the 
effectiveness of aid increases and it has a downward impact on inflation through a 
deep financial sector. Moreover, one-period-ahead dynamics of GDP growth, base 
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money growth, and openness to trade measure push present inflation upward, 
while volatility of GDP growth is insignificant. Note especially that, we found our 
expected sign of gGDP for the past value (1 year before) of gGDP different than 
previous section’s models. 
In Table 4.2.2, we add sqaid to the model specifications in Table 4.2.1. 
Table 4. 2. 2: Regression results of models in Table 4. 2. 1 with sqaid 
Dependent Variable: D 
Explanatory 
Variables: Columns: I II III IV 
 D(-1)
 
39.85*** 
(24.40) 
39.72*** 
(24.40) 
38.70*** 
(21.40) 
38.42*** 
(21.30) 
 Aid 0.36*** (4.61) 
0.35*** 
(4.53) 
0.35*** 
(4.63) 
0.35*** 
(4.47) 
sqaid -0.01*** (-8.23) 
-0.01*** 
(-7.89) 
-0.01*** 
(-8.30) 
-0.01*** 
(-8.04) 
gresvM(-1) 0.01*** (39.50) 0.01*** (36.00) 0.01*** (37.00) 0.01*** (34.10) 
gGDP(-1) 0.08** (1.97) 0.08* (1.91) 0.06 (1.62) 0.06 (1.60) 
vol3(-1) … 0.00 (0.11) … 0.04 (0.83) 
trade(-1) … … 0.04* (1.91) 0.04* (1.91) 
aid*iprvtcred -0.83*** (-2.94) 
-0.88*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.83*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.86*** 
(-2.77) 
Constant -0.24*** (-9.47) 
-0.24*** 
(-9.49) 
-0.27*** 
(-11.00) 
-0.27*** 
(-10.60) 
No. of observation 1200 1200 1198 1198 
Wald (joint) 6079 [0.000] 5292 [0.000] 5228 [0.000] 4747 [0.000] 
Wald (dummy) 89.76 [0.000] 90.11 [0.000] 121.30 [0.000] 112.90 [0.000] 
Sargan test 51.72 [1.000] 
51.63 
[1.000] 
51.30 
[1.000] 
51.10 
[1.000] 
AR(2) test 0.13 [0.895] 0.13 [0.893] 0.09 [0.931] 0.08 [0.937] 
Wald(Aid,sqaid, 
aid*iprvtcred) 
166.90 
[0.000] 
158.60 
[0.000] 
163.60 
[0.000] 
151.90 
[0.000] 
Wald (Aid, aid*iprvtcred) 21.59 [0.000] 21.18 [0.000] 21.41 [0.000] 20.03 [0.000] 
Note:  All of the coefficients are multiplied by 100. Numbers in parentheses are the t-probabilities; 
numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level. 
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It is again observed that although Aid is insignificant, the joint significance 
Wald test of Aid and aid*iprvtcred shows that they are jointly significant. Thus, 
our hypothesis is still supported. Moreover, coefficient of the first lag of gGDP 
has the expected positive sign in columns I and II. However, when we add   
trade(-1) variable into the model, gGDP(-1) becomes insignificant, as displayed in 
columns III and IV of Table 4.2.2. 
In fact, these findings resolve the problem regarding GDP growth effects. 
Therefore, these set of regressions could be preferred for final analysis. Given our 
hypothesis of positive relationship between aid and inflation holds in all 
regressions, we are not concerned about focusing on any one set discussed 
above68. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68
 If data was monthly then we could have prefered other lag structures. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Even though there exists a substantial amount of research on both inflation 
and foreign aid, to the best of our knowledge, this growing body of research in 
monetary theory has not presented a research on causality from aid to inflation, 
yet. This study attempted to fill this void in the literature by examining the 
significance of foreign aid in the set of inflation determinants. Therefore, we 
modeled inflation not only with the commonly referred to variables, such as 
money growth, lagged inflation or economic growth, but also with foreign aid. 
The scope of this study was extended by the consideration of the recipient 
economy’s financial environment, which specifies the capacity to absorb or to 
manage inflows of aid. After aid inflows to a country, recipient authority can do 
sterilization in order to decrease inflationary pressure. However, this can be 
achieved by deep financial markets. An alternative way of controlling inflationary 
pressure can be to decrease the amount of incoming aid, before aid enters to that 
country. The role of financial environment was accounted for measures of 
financial market development in the model. As a result, while it is mainly 
hypothesized that aid has a significant positive impact on inflation, this upward 
effect of aid on inflation is also hypothesized to diminish as the financial markets 
become more developed.  
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The model was built to be dynamic since lag of inflation is used as an 
explanatory variable so as to carry the persistency feature of inflation into the 
model. Moreover, we included other commonly used determinants of inflation, 
such as the rate of base money growth and the rate of real GDP growth. Aid in 
percentages of GNI and interaction of aid with commonly used measures of 
financial markets development, financial deepening, are included to test our 
hypothesis. Aid term was interacted with a measure of financial development 
variable since it was suspected that good financial environment affects 
performance of foreign aid. This dynamic specification of inflation was analyzed 
utilizing GMM estimation with an unbalanced panel data set, covering 60 
countries in the period 1975-2004, where available.  
Empirical evidence supports the notion of positive impact of aid inflows on 
inflation. In addition, the econometric results support the significant role of 
financial environment. In detail, aid becomes less inflationary when the recipient’s 
financial markets developed enough to absorb or manage inflows of aid. 
Moreover, we obtained expected signs for other control variables, except for 
growth of GDP. However, when we restrict our consideration on the subset of the 
countries with positive economic growth, it is observed that the coefficient 
appears to have expected positive sign. Moreover, the first lag of growth of GDP 
also seems to capture the expected positive sign, where real sector expansion 
becomes inflationary with a one period lag. When the model specification is 
converted to a specification including only the first lagged growth terms of reserve 
money and GDP, it is observed that all significant explanatory variables have 
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expected signs, and particularly, aid and FMD interaction is again negatively 
significant. 
The results of especially foreign aid and aid - FMD interaction are strongly 
robust, which is accepted to be our main concern. In further steps, nonlinearity of 
aid was considered as well as the outliers in aid series. In addition, since the data 
set consists of aid recipient countries, possible and expected variability of 
economic growth in these countries was considered by inserting a volatility of 
GDP growth into the model. It was observed that outliers in aid series are 
negligible. However, the volatility of the real GDP growth appears to be a 
significant variable in most of the models, as expected. Furthermore, the 
regression results for that include squared aid showed that when foreign aid 
inflows rise with an increasing amount, it has a fostering upward pressure on 
inflation. Last but not least, the results of the empirical analysis are robust to 
several control variables, and alternative measures of financial markets 
development.  
An additional issue which will likely focus further attention is the effect of 
exchange rate regime. As stated in Kohli (2001) and Buffie et al. (2004), 
exchange rate regime has an impact on appreciation and monetary expansion. 
Thus, since exchange rate regime matter for quantifying aid’s effect on inflation, it 
can be a concern for our study as well. Besides, while changes in world price of 
oil have found to have less powerful in explaining inflation (IMF, 2001), the 
exchange rate is suggested to be an important variable in explaining inflation, 
especially in emerging markets (Domaç, 2004). In addition, the interaction of 
GDP growth and volatility can be considered for different scenarios in order to 
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measure further the effect of volatility of GDP growth on inflation. These 
variables can be considered as an additional control variable to explain inflation in 
future work. To sum up, the next stage to develop this empirical research should 
include considering different model specifications, testing some further control 
variables, such as world price of oil or real exchange rate, and controlling for the 
possibility for the effect of exchange rate regime of the recipient country.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: List of variables: Abbreviations, Sources of Data, 
and Derivations 
Appendix A 
Appendix A.1 Primary Data 
 
 Aid (% of GNI) (Aid): (Source: World Development Indicators Online 
(World Bank), Series Code: DT.ODA.ALLD.GN.ZS, Years: 1960-2004) 
 
 Domestic credit provided by banking sector (%GDP) (Domcred): 
(Source: World Development Indicators Online (World Bank), Series Code: 
FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS, Years: 1960-2004) 
 
 Domestic credit to private sector (%GDP) (Domcredtoprvt): (Source: 
World Development Indicators Online (World Bank), Series Code: 
FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS, Years: 1960-2004) 
 
 GDP deflator (base year varies by country)  (GDPdef) : (Source: World 
Development Indicators Online (World Bank), Series Code: NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS, 
Years: 1960-2003) 
 
 GDP growth (annual %) (gGDP): (Source: World Development 
Indicators Online (World Bank), Series Code: NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG, Years: 
1960-2003) 
 
 Liquid liabilities to GDP (Liqliab): (Source: IMF/structure_data base, 
Years: 1960-2001. Calculated using the following deflation method: 
{(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is liquid liablities, P_e is 
end-of period consumer price index (CPI), and P_a is average annual CPI. Raw 
data are from the electronic version of the IMF's International Financial Statistics 
(IFS). Data on GDP in local currency, end-of period CPI, and annual CPI are from 
the electronic version of the IFS. 
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 Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (Prvtcred): (Source: 
IMF/structure_data base, Years: 1960-2001) Calculated using the following 
deflation method: {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is credit 
to the private sector, P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a is average annual CPI. 
Raw data are from the electronic version of the IMF's International Financial 
Statistics. Data on GDP in local currency, end-of period CPI, and annual CPI are 
from the electronic version of the IFS. 
 
 Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
to GDP (Prvtcrednofi): (Source: IMF/structure_data base, Years: 1960-2001) 
Calculated using the following deflation method: {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-
1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is credit to the private sector, P_e is end-of period CPI, 
and P_a is average annual CPI. Raw data are from the electronic version of the 
IMF's International Financial Statistics. Data on GDP in local currency, end-of 
period CPI, and annual CPI are from the electronic version of the IFS. 
 
 Reserve Money (resvM): (Source: International Financial Statistics(IFS)-
Economic Concept View-Monetary Authorities, Series Code: 14...ZF, Years: 
1960-2004). 
 
 Trade (% of GDP) (trade): (Source: World Development Indicators 
Online (World Bank), Series Code: NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS, Years: 1960-2004). 
 
 
Appendix A.2 Variables Created 
 
 aid*iliqliab is calculated using the following formula:  
ttt iliqliabAidiliqliabaid ** =  
 
 aid*iprvtcred is calculated using the following formula: 
ttt iprvtcredAidiprvtcredaid ** =  
 
 aid*iprvtcrednofi is calculated using the following formula: 
ttt ofiiprvtcrednAidofiiprvtcrednaid ** =  
 
 aid*ishareprvt is calculated using the following formula: 
ttt ishareprvtAidishareprvtaid ** =  
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 aid*ishareprvtL is calculated using the following formula: 
ttt LishareprvtAidLishareprvtaid ** =  
 
 da*Aid is calculated using the formula: ttt AiddaAidda ** =  
 
 dg*gGDP is calculated using the formula: ttt gGDPdggGDPdg ** =  
 
 di*gGDP is calculated using the formula: ttt gGDPdigGDPdi ** =  
 
 Growth of Reserve Money (gresvM): calculated using the following 
formula: 100*)(
1
1
−
−
−
=
t
tt
t
resvM
resvMresvM
gresvM  
 
 Inflation (pi ): calculated using the below formula:  
100*)(
1
1
−
−
−
=
t
tt
t GDPdef
GDPdefGDPdef
pi  
 
 Liquid liabilities to GDP index (iliqliab): calculated using the following 
formula: { }Liqliab
Liqliab
iliqliab
t
t
t
max
=  
 
 Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP index (iprvtcred): 
calculated using the following formula:  { }vtcred
vtcred
iprvtcred
t
t
t Prmax
Pr
=  
 
 Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
to GDP index (iprvtcrednofi): calculated using the following formula:   
{ }vtcrednofi
vtcrednofi
ofiiprvtcredn
t
t
t Prmax
Pr
=  
 
 Square of aid series (sqaid): calculated by taking the square of Aid series. 
 
 Square of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP index 
(sqiprvtcred): calculated by taking the square of iprvtcred series. 
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 The real rate of depreciation in money stock (D): calculated using the 
following formula: )100/(1
)100/(
t
t
tD pi
pi
+
=  . 
 
 The share of banking sector credit to the private sector in the total 
banking sector credit (Shareprvt): calculated by: 
t
t
t Domcred
rvtDomcredtopShareprvt = .  
 
 The share of banking sector credit to the private sector in the total 
banking sector credit index (ishareprvt): calculated using the following formula:  
{ }Shareprvt
Shareprvt
ishareprvt
t
t
t
max
= . 
 
 The share of banking sector credit to the private sector in the total 
banking sector credit without Lesotho (ShareprvtL): It is the series of Shareprvt 
without the inputs of  Lesotho. 
 
 The share of banking sector credit to the private sector in the total 
banking sector credit index without Lesotho (ishareprvtL): It is the series of 
ishareprvt in which the inputs of the country Lesotho are omitted. 
 
 Volatility in growth of GDP (vol3 and vol5): calculated using the 
following formulas:  
),,(3 11 +−= tttt gGDPgGDPgGDPstdevvol       
),,,,(5 2112 ++−−= tttttt gGDPgGDPgGDPgGDPgGDPstdevvol   
where stdev is the standard deviation function defined as 
)1(
)( 22
−
−
=
∑ ∑
nn
xxn
stdev i i
ii
. 
Missing (or not available, na) observations were not used as zero valued 
observations during the calculations, they were just omitted. 
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Appendix A.3 Dummies 
 Dummy of Aid (% of GNI) (da): 
otherwiseif
Aidifnada
1
40"" >=  
 Dummy of GDP growth (dg):  
otherwiseif
gGDPifdg
1
00 <=  
 Dummy of Inflation (di):  
otherwiseif
ifdi
0
1001 >= pi   
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Appendix B: Table of countries in the data set 
No Country Name No Country Name 
1 Argentina  31 Jordan  
2 Belize  32 Kenya  
3 Bhutan  33 Lesotho  
4 Bolivia  34 Madagascar  
5 Botswana  35 Malaysia  
6 Brazil  36 Mali  
7 Burkina Faso  37 Mauritania  
8 Burundi  38 Mauritius  
9 Cameroon  39 Morocco  
10 Chad  40 Nepal  
11 Chile  41 Nicaragua  
12 China, P. R.: Mainland 42 Nigeria  
13 Colombia  43 Oman  
14 Congo, Republic of 44 Papua New Guinea  
15 Costa Rica  45 Peru  
16 Côte d'Ivoire  46 Rwanda  
17 Dominican Republic  47 Seychelles  
18 Ecuador  48 Sierra Leone  
19 Egypt  49 Sri Lanka  
20 El Salvador  50 St. Vincent & Grens. 
21 Ethiopia  51 Swaziland  
22 Fiji  52 Thailand  
23 Ghana  53 Togo  
24 Grenada  54 Trinidad and Tobago  
25 Guatemala  55 Tunisia  
26 Guyana  56 Uganda  
27 Haiti  57 Uruguay  
28 Honduras  58 Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
29 India  59 Zambia  
30 Indonesia  60 Zimbabwe  
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Appendix C: Table of descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable Mean Min Max Std. Deviation 
D 0.12 
-1.26 
(St. Vincent & 
Grens. 1975) 
0.99 
(Nicaragua 
1988) 
0.17 
gresvM 52.33 
-57.81 
(Papua New 
Guinea 1980) 
10420.00 
(Nicaragua 
1990) 
435.49 
gGDP 3.67 -50.25 (Rwanda 1994) 
141.50 
(St. Vincent & 
Grens. 1975) 
6.43 
Aid 7.08 -0.47 (Malaysia 1996) 
95.56 
(Rwanda 1994) 8.45 
Liqliab 0.36 
0.02 
(Nicaragua 
1990) 
1.50 
(China 2001) 0.22 
Prvtcred 0.22 
0.01 
(Nicaragua 
1990) 
1.22 
(Thailand 1998) 0.18 
Prvtcrednofi 0.26 0.01 (Uganda 1987) 1.55 (Malaysia 1998) 0.20 
ShareprvtL 0.70 
-47.25 
(Trinidad and 
Tobago 1975) 
86.19 
(Mauritania 
1999) 
3.18 
trade 70.25 6.32 (Ghana 1982) 
282.40 
(Guyana 1992) 39.98 
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Appendix D: Table of correlations 
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Appendix E: Graphs  
 
Figure 1: Graph of pi versus Aid 
 
Note: The graphs in this appendix were drawn after omitting “na” data for series in x and y axes. 
 
Table E. 1: The list of outliers in Aid series (Aid > 40) 
Country Name Year Aid 
Rwanda  1994 95.56 
Nicaragua  1991 72.34 
Zambia  1995 62.87 
Guyana  1990 61.34 
Nicaragua  1996 58.49 
Guyana  1991 54.14 
Rwanda  1995 54.05 
Nicaragua  1992 50.68 
Sierra Leone  2001 47.47 
Mauritania  1978 47.12 
Sierra Leone  2002 47.00 
Nicaragua  1994 45.68 
Nicaragua  1995 44.59 
Mauritania  1976 40.25 
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Table E. 2: The list of hyperinflation cases (pi >100)
Country Name Year pi  
Nicaragua 1988 13571.88 
Bolivia 1985 12338.66 
Peru 1990 6837.33 
Nicaragua 1990 5003.11 
Nicaragua 1989 4728.57 
Nicaragua 1991 4523.70 
Argentina 1989 3059.39 
Peru 1989 2928.48 
Brazil 1990 2515.77 
Brazil 1994 2239.13 
Argentina 1990 2076.79 
Brazil 1993 1996.64 
Bolivia 1984 1444.12 
Brazil 1989 1321.71 
Brazil 1992 973.06 
Brazil 1988 651.34 
Argentina 1985 627.05 
Argentina 1984 607.02 
Nicaragua 1987 524.39 
Argentina 1976 438.89 
Brazil 1991 411.96 
Argentina 1988 387.93 
Argentina 1983 383.05 
Peru 1991 379.89 
Peru 1988 372.35 
Chile 1975 334.65 
Nicaragua 1986 279.63 
Bolivia 1983 264.75 
Chile 1976 250.61 
Brazil 1985 231.13 
Bolivia 1986 230.02 
Brazil 1984 212.63 
Argentina 1982 207.29 
Brazil 1987 204.07 
Argentina 1975 197.52 
 
Country Name Year pi  
Uganda 1988 189.98 
Uganda 1987 180.99 
Nicaragua 1985 168.66 
Peru 1985 166.58 
Sierra Leone 1987 165.68 
Zambia 1992 165.53 
Guyana 1989 162.62 
Argentina 1978 161.59 
Argentina 1977 159.45 
Bolivia 1982 158.47 
Argentina 1979 147.09 
Brazil 1986 146.00 
Zambia 1993 143.66 
Brazil 1983 140.30 
Uganda 1986 137.28 
Argentina 1991 132.95 
Sierra Leone 1991 128.77 
Argentina 1987 127.01 
Guyana 1991 126.74 
Ghana 1983 123.06 
Uganda 1985 120.34 
Grenada 1994 117.16 
Venezuela 1996 115.52 
Uganda 1989 115.45 
Peru 1984 110.19 
Zimbabwe 2002 107.51 
Uruguay 1990 106.84 
Brazil 1981 106.75 
Argentina 1981 106.45 
Zambia 1990 106.39 
Chile 1977 105.79 
Brazil 1982 105.10 
Peru 1983 103.83 
Uruguay 1991 100.81 
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Figure 2: Graph of D versus Aid 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Graph of D versus Aid ( Aid > 40 data is omitted ) 
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Figure 4: Graph of D versus Aid ( Without Hyperinflation Cases ) 
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Appendix F: The results of Wald tests for different model 
specifications  
 
Appendix F. 1: The results of Wald tests for model (4.1.1) 
For model (4.1.1): Wald Test Statistics 
Testing DD(-1) and Daid: 686.9 [0.000]  
Testing DD(-1) and DgresvM: 2511. [0.000]  
Testing DD(-1) and DgGDP: 705.5 [0.000]  
Testing DAid and DgresvM: 1262. [0.000]  
Testing DAid and DgGDP: 160.3 [0.000]  
Testing DgresvM and DgGDP: 1610. [0.000]  
 
Appendix F. 2: The results of Wald tests for model (4.1.2) 
For model (4.1.2): Wald Test Statistics 
Testing DD(-1) and Daid: 454.7 [0.000]  
Testing DD(-1) and Dsqaid: 409.6 [0.000]  
Testing DD(-1) and DgresvM: 2048. [0.000]  
Testing DD(-1) and DgGDP: 490.0 [0.000]  
Testing DAid and Dsqaid: 6.061 [0.048]  
Testing DAid and DgresvM: 1316. [0.000]  
Testing DAid and DgGDP: 178.3 [0.000]  
Testing Dsqaid and DgresvM: 1309. [0.000]  
Testing Dsqaid and DgGDP: 177.4 [0.000]  
Testing DgresvM and DgGDP: 1571. [0.000]  
 
